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Abstract 
The study of the Russian policy of Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
immediately following World War I has undergone revision in recent years. 
Most recent historians accept that Lloyd George held consistent goals in 
Russian policy: withdrawal from the Russian Civil War and peace with the 
Soviet government. His policy only appeared erratic to his contemporaries 
because of his roundabout ways of pursuing his policy goals. The domestic 
influences which encouraged the prime minister to seek an end to intervention 
were social, economic, and political. Social reforms were demanded by the 
public and were widely viewed in government circles as a cure for the growing 
radicalism in Britain. Reconstru.ction, however, was a costly endeavour which 
was endangered by fmancial difficulties caused by the war. The demands of 
economic orthodoxy for a balanced budget, combined with growing military 
commitments, threatened to squeeze social spending out of the budget. Only by 
reducing the cost of operations in Russia could Lloyd George fmd the money 
needed for the popularly supported reforms. Political factors played the 
dominant role in changing the course of Russian policy as Lloyd George adapted 
to the Conservative party's opposition to the end of intervention in. Russia. The 
result was the April 1919 policy of providing the White Russian counter-
revolutionaries with materiel and money but not troops. 
1 
Introduction: 
Views of Lloyd George's Russian Policy 
Traditionally, David Lloyd George's foreign policy has been described as 
opportunistic and without foundation. This theme was first taken up by 1 
Valentine Chirol in 1923. In reviewing the Lloyd George Coalition Government, 
he saw a decline in British foreign policy and placed the blame on the prime 
minister. Lloyd George had "eclipsed" the Foreign Office and brought a 
"perplexing and alarming instability" to foreign affairs. 1 The unexpected turns 
which occurred in foreign policy, Chirol explained, were the result of the prime 
minister's dislike of experts: 
[H]e preferred his erratic flashes of intuition ... [and] changing impressions, 
often gathered from conversations with casual visitors who ranked with him as 
great authorities as soon as they had said the things that he wanted to have 
said to him. 2 ·· 
Chirol _found support for his views from John Maynard Keynes when the 
economist described Lloyd George as "rooted in nothing; he is void and without 
content; he lives and feeds on his immediate surroundings. "3 Many historians 
based their later interpretations of Lloyd George's foreign policy on these 
foundations, presenting a picture of an unprincipled, capricious prime minister. 
To a certain extent A.J.P. Taylor has maintained this view. He has commented 
that Lloyd George "was happiest when impro~sing policies toward an 11nknown 
goal" and ''had no friends and did not deserve any."4 
1V. Chirol, "Four Years of Lloyd-Georgian Foreign Policy," The Edinburgh Review, 237, 483 
(January 1923): 3. 
21bid., 4. 
3J.M. Keynes, Essays in Biography, G. Keynes, ed. Paperback ed. (London 1961), 36. 
4K.O. Morgan, Lloyd George (London 1974), 8; A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 
(Oxford 1979), 7 4. 
2 ( 
One dissenter was Harold Nicolson who said that "the volatility of Mr. 
Lloyd George's methods has concealed from the eyes of many a critic the rock-
like immobility of his aims."5 Recently, his views have appealed to a new 
generation of historians. Foremost among the revisionists has been Kenneth 
Morgan. While admitting that Lloyd George's methods in foreign policy were 
"endlessly flexible," Morgan argues that his goals were consistent.6 In 
opposition to the traditionalists, Morgan believes that Lloyd George did have 
principles and "that his career was determined by long-term objectives to a 
degree unusual among British politicians. "7 
The new trend of thought has influenced studies of his Russian policy 
during the first post-war months. John Thompson, pointing out Lloyd George's 
"capricious and inconsistent" methods, stresses the prime minister's consistent 
goals of\~nding intervention and seeking rapprochement with the Bolsheviks.8 
'\,, 
'• 
' Thompson a:l~ presents the outline of causes and events which is accepted by 
most revisio~t hist.orians surveying the British Russian policy of late 
"··· 
1918/early 1919: Lloyd George's personal decisions to end intervention and 
make peace with the Bolsheviks were blocked by the Conservatives in his 
government and the French at the Paris peace conference. 9 Even Richard 
Ullman's account in the second volume of his masterly study of Anglo-Soviet 
5H. Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925 (London 1934), 223. 
6Morgan, 212. 
7Jbid. 
8J.M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton, NJ 1966), 52. 
9See C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy, 1902-1922 
(London 1972), 2: 323-25 and G.F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, 
paperback ed. (New York 1961), 119-30. 
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relations does not go far beyond this outline except in details. IO 
Surely, there were more influences at work on Lloyd George than pressure 
from the backbenchers and opposition from Clemenceau. What forces were 
pushing the prime minister to get out of Russia? After all, Lloyd George was 
first and foremost a politician, facing a myriad of domestic concerns which 
would impact upon his foreign policy decisions. These "background influences" 
have been examined on a theoretical level by Paul Kennedy. He points to social, 
economic, institutional, and political factors which all had effects on Lloyd 
George after the war and thus on foreign policy~11 Few historians have viewed 
Lloyd George's Russian policy from this perspective. F.S. Northedge, besides,4 
pointing out that Tory opposition blocked Lloyd George's plans, also touches 
upon unrest in the army, public opinion, and fmancial troubles as causes for the 
prime minister's desire to get out of Russia.12 However, given the scope of his 
work, Northedge is only able to give the most cursory glance at these factors. 
Arno Mayer briefly mentions that Lloyd George was driven by "overstrained 
resources and anti-interventionist pressures" to try to withdraw from Russia but 
fails to explain the statement. 13 Instead, he presents a lengthy discussion of 
political events in ideological terms.14 Evidently, Mayer believes that Lloyd 
George failed to achieve his goals because of what he terms the "ridgification" of 
10R.H. tnlman,Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921 (Princeton, NJ 1968), 2: 59-157. 
11P. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background lnfiuences on British External 
Policy, 1865-1980 (London 1981), 223-58. 
12F.S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant (New York 1967), 76-82. 
13AJ. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at 
Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York 1967), 22,314. 
14Ibid., 604-47. 
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the Right against Bolshevism.15 The conflict between the Left and the Right is 
also addressed by Gustav Schmidt. However, he draws a direct relationship 
between domestic events and the prime minister's policy. Largely ignoring 
economic factors, Schmidt sees Lloyd George's actions as resulting from the 
needs to fight social unrest and Tory reactionaries in Britain. Only through 
reconstruction at home and a settlement of the Russian problem abroad, 
Schmidt argues, could Lloyd George secure domestic peace.16 In the end, the 
prime minister did not secure his goals largely because he abandoned them in 
the face of Tory opposition.17 
Thus, the scholarship to date has accepted that Lloyd George held 
consistent goals in his Russian policy; but beyond political factors, few 
historians have examined how other aspects of post-World War I Britain 
affected policy. Only Northedge gives a very brief explanation of how the 
\ 
domestic scene as a whole affected the prime minister's decisions. This thesis is 
designed to ftll the gap in historiography. By studying the first few months of 
Lloyd George's post-war Russian policy in detail, it shows how domestic factors 
-- social, economic, and political -- and policy creation were intertwined. 
Chapters one and two examine the effects on the British scene of intervention in 
the Russian Civil War and the problems which it caused for Lloyd George. 
Chapters three and four discuss the relationship between domestic events and 
policy changes, and the final section draws one or two brief conclusions. 
15Ibid., 23. 
16G. Schmidt, ''Wozu noch 'politische Geschichte'? Zurn Verhaltnis von Innen- und 
Aussenpolitik am Beispiel der englischen Friedensstrategie 1918/1919," Aus Politik. Und Zei:t 
Geschichte Bl 7/75 (26 April 1975): 3~~40. 
17Ibid., 45. . .~) 
. ( 
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Chapter 1 
The Problem of Russia 
The dramatic events in Russia following the March revolution had 
profound effects in all European capitals. The political implications were 
particularly serious in London since they threatened to sever the tenuous links 
between the Liberal prime minister and the Conservatives who dominated his 
coalition government. In addition, there were severe financial consequences 
which have been ignored by most historians. · This chapter examines, in tum, 
the response of the Tories to intervention and the extent of the financial 
problems caused by British involvement in the Russian Civil War. 
**** 
British and Allied troops were sent to Russia in response to the collapse of 
Russia's military effort.18 With its supply shortages and inept leadership, the 
c: 
Russian military had always been of great concern to the Allies but proved most 
troubling in the latter half of 1917. It had been hoped that the overthrow of 
Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917 would bring about a reinvigoration of Russia's 
war effort. The Times had commented that "the army and the people have 
<) 
joined hands to overthrow the forces of reaction which were stifling the national 
aspirations and strangling the national efforts."19 However, the Provisional 
Government's much lauded massive Russian offensive of July 1917 proved a 
total failure. General Alfred W.F. Knox's report of the action to London spoke of 
' . 
18For the origins of Allied and British intervention see the first two volumes of R.H. Ullman, 
Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, (Princeton, NJ 1961, 1968) and G.F. Kennan, Russia and the 
West Under Lenin and Stalin, paperback ed. (New York 1961), chapters 1-7. 
19The Times, 19 March 1917. Also see Telegram 1130, Francis (Ambassador at Petrograd) to 
Lansing, 23 March 1917, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, 
Russia (Washington, DC 1931), 1: 15. Hereafter cited as FRUS, 1918, Russia. 
6 
•., 
"indiscipline everywhere" within the Russian army and stated that "[i]t is 
impossible to avoid the uncomfortable conclusion that the war in Russia is 
coming more and more to be regarded as a secondary matter. "20 The Russians 
were primarily concerned with the internal problems caused by the strain of 
war: inflation was out of control, industrial output was falling, and food was 
becoming ever scarcer. Most of all, the people were tired of war. Discontent was 
widespread and led to open revolt after the failed July offensive. A month later 
there was an abortive coup d'etat by General L.G. Kornilov, revealing that 
dissatisfaction with Kerensky was not limited to the peasants and workers. The 
authority of Kerensky's government was clearly collapsing. Meanwhile, the 
Bolsheviks were moving toward gaining control of the Petrograd and Moscow 
Soviets.21 The ~treets were becoming the arbiters of power; and on November 7, 
the Bolsheviks seized power with relative ease. 
These events were viewed with ever increasing alarm by the British. It 
was widely and fervently believed that victory in the West hinged upon the 
continued belligerence of Russia. Sir William Robertson (the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff) warned the War Cabinet, "If Russia makes a separate ~ 
peace or if the greater part of the enemy's forces now on the Eastern front are 
able to come West, there may not be adequate prospect for obtaining decisive 
results in the coming year."22 As early as July the British government was 
advising its allies to "make every sacrifice in order to retain Russia in the 
Alliance, and, by affording her constant support in every department, to infuse 
20Excerpts of telegram dated 10 July 1917 from General Knox appear in David Lloyd George, 
War Memoirs (London 1936), 5: 2542, 2546. Hereafter cited as War Memoirs. 
,.. 
21Bakhmeteff (Russian Ambassador at Washington) to Lansing, 18 September 1917. FRUS, 
1918, Russia, 1: 193. 
22From the memorandum, "Future Military Policy," 19 November 1917. Ullman, 1: 40. 
7 
J 
into her Government the energy necessary to hold out at all costs. "23 Such steps 
were necessary for, as one military attache wrote, "The country is moving 
straight to ruin as things stand at present."24 There was no will to fight, the 
economy was on the verge of collapse, and food could not reach the cities because 
the railway system was breaking down. The British recognized in October that 
Russian resistance against the Germans was rapidly failing as Austrian 
prisoners were left to escape and deserters clogged the roads.25 There was little 
the British could do to support the Russians because manpower and materiel 
were scarce. The government even feared that it would come under attack for 
wasting any of these valuable resources on an ineffectual Russian war machine. 
As a result, Britain sought to tie continued support to military action: 
To restore confidence ... it behooves the Russian Government to show by acts 
its resolve to employ all proper means to revive discipline and true military 
spirit among the fighting troops, at the same time it will insure ... the 
reestablishment of order at the front as at the rear.26 
The greatest threat to the Allied war effort was the November revolution. 
Despite Lenin's Decree on Peace, which called upon all belligerents to negotiate 
a just and democratic peace without annexations or indemnities,27 the British 
sought somehow to keep Russia in the war. 
The government now faced the added difficulty that there was no longer 
one, unified Russia. The Soviets controlled an area only roughly equivalent to 
the old duchy of Muscovy. The Ukraine, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states 
23Memorandum presented at the Inter-Allied Conference in Paris on 25 July 1917. War Memoirs, 5: 2550. 
241bid., 2558. 
251bid., 2565. Also see Telegram 53, General Judson (Military Attach/ in Russia) to the War College Staff, 7 October 1917. FRUS, 1918, Russia, 1: 204-5. 
26Telegram 1852, Frances to Lansing, 9 October 1917. FRUS, 1918, Russia, 1: 208. 
27J. Degras, Soviet Documents On Foreign Policy (London 1951), 1: 1-3. 
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had declared their independence, while Siberia and the Caucasus were areas of 
contention between the Bolsheviks and other political factions. In the Don 
basin, the Cossacks had reasserted their old autonomy, electing General A.M. 
Kaledin "ataman."28 The situation was just too complicated and uncertain for 
swift and steady action. The government did not want to take "any overt 
official" action against the Bolsheviks for it "might only strengthen their 
determination to make peace, and might be used to inflame anti-Allied feeling 
in Russia, and so def eat the very object we were aiming at. "29 Nor did the 
government want to commit itself fully to Kaledin's regime which openly 
declared its support of the Allied cause while asking for fmancial aid. 30 
Unsurprisingly, the government was split on how to proceed. Robert Cecil 
(Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), whose hatred of Bolshevism was 
well known, believed support should be given to "those elements who are 
genuinely friendly to the Enten~ __ of whom the chief are Kaledin, Alexeieff [his 
commander-in-chief] and their group."31 Further, he believed, 
If ... a southern block could be formed consisting of the Caucasus, the 
Cossacks, the Ukraine and the Ro11manians, it would be able to set up a 
reasonably stable government and would in any case through ~ol))mand of oil, 
coal, and corn control the whole of Russia. 32 
Such arguments helped lead the War Cabinet to authorize financial support for 
Kaledin. Arthur Balfour (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), however, was 
not sure of the seriousness of the Bolshevik talk of peace, and he did not want a 
28Ullman, 1: 42n4. 
29Excerpt from a War Cabinet meeting of 22 November 1917. War Memoirs, 5: 2565-66. 
3°Ullman, 1: 43. 
31Telegram 2407, Cecil to Buchanan (Ambassador at Petrograd), 3 December 1917. C.J. Lowe 
and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy, 1902-22 (London 1972), 3: 661. 
Also see Cecil's comments in the War Cabinet minutes of 21 December 1917. Ibid., 658-59. 
32Cecil to Buchanan, 3 December 1917. Ibid., 661. 
9 
\ 
rupture with the Soviet government. He dissented from Cecil's view that "the 
Bolsheviks could only be regarded as avowed enemies."33 The Bolsheviks were 
anti-British, he argued, ''because they think that the British Empire is the great 
obstacle to immediate peace." Therefore, "contrary to the opinion of some of my 
colleagues, I am clearly of opinion that it is to our advantage to avoid, as long as 
possible, an open breach with this crazy system. "34 This policy would not stop 
the transfer of German troops westward but it would hinder the exploitation of 
Russian resources. Russia was in a chaotic state and Balfour wanted to delay 
"the organisation of the country by Gern1an officials on German lines" as long as 
possible. Further, he argued, "no policy would be more fatal than to give the 
Russians motive for welcoming into their midst German officials and German 
soldiers as friends and deliverers."35 This meant no rupture of relations with 
the Soviet government. 
Balfour's views set up an apparently contradictory, but pragmatic, policy. 
Britain was, in effect, recognizing two opposing Russias: the Red and the White. 
The December 10 War Cabinet that reviewed and approved Balfour's 
memorandum was concerned with this: "Was it desirable to treat with both 
Trotzki and Kaledin at one and the same time?"36· The contradiction was 
resolved when it was noted that the assistance to Kaledin was directed against 
the Germans and not against the Bolsheviks and the ref ore had nothing to do 
with the Russian Civil War. The policy was in line with the government's 
position that it "was not primarily or specifically concerned with the composition 
33Balfour's words in his memorandum., "Notes on the Present Russian Situation," 9 December 
1917. Ibid., 3: 667. This document is also presented in War Memoirs, 5: 2573-78. 
34Lowe and Dockrill, 3: 667. 
35Ibid., 669. 
36War Cabinet minutes, 10 December 1917. Ibid., 666. 
10 
of the Russian government, or with the local aspirations of the Bolsheviks or 
other political parties, except in so far as they bore on their attitude to our 
conflict with the Central Powers. "37 
The government's specific objectives were to keep the Bolsheviks from 
entering the German camp while encouraging other Russians to continue the 
fight. As Lords Milner (Secretary of State for War) and Cecil stated in a 
memorandum, 
We should represent to the Bolsheviks that we have no desire to take part in 
any way in the internal politics of Russia, and that any idea that we favour a 
counter-revolution is a profound mistake .... But we feel it necessary to keep in 
touch as far as we can with the Ukraine, the Cof?sacks, Finland, Siberia, the 
Caucasus, etc., because these various semi-autonomous provinces represent a 
very large proportion of the strength ofRussia.38 
·- , 
To appeal to the Bolsheviks' sympathies, the memorandum also suggested that 
the Soviet government be assured of Allied support for the principles of self-
determination and a peace with no annexations or indemnities. Plans were also 
presented for providing financial support to the southern Russian armies. It 
was hoped that such aid would induce them to resume the fight. The resultant 
reconstruction of part of the Eastern front would not only prevent the 
exploitation of Russian wheat and oil but would also force the Germans to 
maintain troops in the area. According to the British plan, the French were to 
finance the Ukraine and Britain would take on the other areas. The British 
recognized that this was a risky policy, for the memorandum stressed "that this 
should be done as quietly as possible so as to avoid the imputation ... that we are 
preparing to make war on the Bolsheviks."39 With the adoption of this proposed 
87Ibid., 664. 
88
''Memorandum prepared by Lord Milner and Lord R. Cecil on Suggested Policy in Russia, and accepted by 
M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon on December 23, 1917." Ibid., 662. Also presented in War Memoirs, 5: 2582-85 
and in Telegram 8090, Page (Ambassador at London) to Lansing, 29 December 1917. FRUS, 1918, Russia, 1: 
330-31. 
39Lowe and Dockrill, 3: 663. 
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policy of dealing with two different Russias arose the problem of diplomatic 
recognition: were the Soviets or the Whites to be recognized? The government's 
ambivalent answer to this question was that neither Russian government would 
be recognized, but both were to be dealt with as the de facto governments of the 
areas they controlled. Balfour explained British policy to the Counselor of the 
British Embassy at Petrograd, Francis Lindley: 
You are apparently under the impression that our informal relations with 
the Bolsheviks ... are necessarily inconsistent with any attempt that may be 
made in other parts of Russia to foster efforts favqurable to the Allied cause. 
We do not take this view. '\Vhenever any 'de facto' administration is set up, 
we have the right to establish informal relations with it, without prejudice to 
the informal relations we may choose to cultivate with organizations beyond 
its effective jurisdiction. 
Balfour concluded by saying "[o]f course we should abandon this policy of 
informal relations the moment it hampered our efforts to secure" aid for the 
Allied cause.40 He later summed up his views in a telegram to R.H. Bruce 
Lockhart, Britain's unofficial agent in Petrograd: "I have repeatedly and clearly 
explained that His Majesty's Government· have no desire to interfere with the 
internal affairs of Russia, but are only concerned in the vigorous prosecution of 
the war."41 
After Trotsky's desperate policy of "no war - no peace" at Brest-Litovsk 
and the consequent German advance, begun on 18 February 1918, the helpless 
Soviet government signed the peace treaty with Germany on March 3.42 The 
results of the Bolsheviks' actions were disastrous for Britain and the Allies. The 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk put the Baltic states, parts of Byelorussia, and the 
entire Ukraine into German hands. It neutralized the Allied blockade of 
4°Telegram 129, Balfour to Lindley, 24 January 1918. Ibid., 669-70. 
41Telegram 4, Balfour to Lockhart, 6 March 1918. Ibid., 671. 
42Text of treaty in FRUS, 1918, Russia, 1: 442-71. 
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Germany and meant, in Lloyd George's words, "the prolongation of the struggle, 
perhaps by years."43 The British were also concerned about securing the huge 
mountains of precious war stores sitting in the ports of Murmansk, Archangel, 
and Vladivostok. More importantly, the Germans were now completely free to 
transfer division upon division of frontline troops to the Western front. The 
situation was desperate and there was little the Allies could do in response. The 
position of the Allies was later described by the American general, Tasker 
H. Bliss: 
[T]he Allies watched day by day the Germans withdrawing an increasing 
n11mber of divisions from their Russian front and adding them to the 
forces ... that they intended to employ in a tremendous effort early in 
[1918] .... The situation was such to cause the Allies the gravest apprehension. 
They were ready to clutch at every straw which seemed to afford the slightest 
chance of supporting their sinking weight .... 44 
In Balfour's view, the Bolsheviks were now considered not only fanatics but also 
traitors. "The Bolshevists have destroyed every force which was capable of 
resisting the enemy: the Russian Army, the Roumanian Army, and the Trans-
Caucasian Levies. "45 Th~ Bolsheviks could redeem themselves only by asking 
for Allied support to fight the Germans. Britain was prepared to send aid 
through the northern ports of Murmansk and Archangel; however, as Balfour 
complained, no "invitation" had been received. Furthermore, "the very 
suggestion that Japan should ... [intervene] is seemingly regarded as an 
intolerable wrong" by the Soviets and Americans.46 Balfour hoped that 
I 
Lockhart could convince the Soviet government "to co-operate heartily with the 
43War Memoirs, 5: 2572. 
44
"Report of General Tasker H. Bliss, Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War 
Council" dated 19 February 1920. FRUS: Lansing Papers 1914 - 1920 (Washington, DC 1940), 2: 269. 
45Telegram 12, Balfour to Lockhart, 13 March 1918. Lowe and Dockrill, 3: 672. 
46Jbid. 
13 
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Powers which alone desire to see Russia independent and secure." However, it 
was intolerable "to allow Germany a free hand from the Vistula to 
·' 
Vladivostok. "4 7 
This cooperation was thought to be essential if British plans for 
intervention were to be implemented. Part of the British strategy called for 
Allied troops to be landed in North Russia to guard the ports of Archangel and 
Murmansk and the war supplies there.48 These forces were to be built up to the 
extent that they could assume offensive capabilities, reconstructing the Eastern 
front around Petrograd or moving southward toward Vologda to link up with an 
Allied army coming from Siberia. The predominantly Japanese Siberian army 
(was to land at Vladivostok and move westward along the trans-Siberian 
\railway. The objects of this operation were to guard the stores at Vladivostok 
and prevent German exploitation of Siberia. However, Balfour warned, any 
"intervention undertaken in defiance of ... [the Bolsheviks] might involve the risk 
of throwing them directly into the arms of Germany."49 - In early March, an 
invitation did come from the Murmansk Soviet which welcomed a company of 
Royal Marines to help defend the city from the Germans and White Finns.50 So 
Balfour's belief that Trotsky "has shown signs that he desires co-operation with 
the Allies" was not unfounded.51 
By mid-May it was "obvious" to Lloyd George "that the Allied 
Governments must be prepared to act without waiting for an invitation from 
47lbid. 
48See Telegram 88, Balfour to Young (British Consul at Archangel), 2 July 1918. Ibid., 687-88. 
49Telegram 238, Balfour to Jordan (British Minister at Peking), 30 April 1918. Ibid., 674-75. 
5°Thls Soviet later broke its ties with Petrograd. tnlman, 1: 116-19. 
51Balfour to Jordan, 30 April 1918. Lowe and Dockrill, 3: 675. 
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M. Trotzki."52 A military committee was set up to consider what steps "could 
immediately be taken to organise military resistance to the enemy in Russia. "53 
The committee believed that "an undue weight had been placed ... on the 
desirability of an invitation for intervention from the Bolshevik Government. "54 
Not surprisingly, actions quickly followed. On June 23 General C.C.M. 
Maynard landed at Murmansk with 600 men to defend the port.55 Preparations 
were then made for a landing at Bolshevik-held Archangel. Following an anti-
Soviet coup the night before, General F.C. Poole easily overcame the Soviet 
~ 
defenses as he sailed into the port on August 2. By early September Maynard 
had over 6,000 men in Murmansk and Poole over 8,000 in Archangel, most of 
whom were Americans.56 The presence of U.S. troops reflected President 
Wilson's decision on July 17 to become involved in Russia.57 The U.S. 
justification for this decision was that the Czechoslovak forces -- which had 
fought alongside the Russian army in hopes of creating an independent 
Czechoslovak state -- were now trapped in Russia and needed Allied assistance. 
The American acceptance of Britain's plans opened the door to intervention in 
Siberia. Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces were now flooded with 
Japanese troops, 12,000 landed between August 3 and 10. By the end of the war 
there were over 70,000 Japanese soldiers in eastern Russia as well as 7,500 
52w ar Cabinet minutes, 11 May 1918. Ibid., 678. 
53
"Intervention In Russia," appendix to the War Cabinet minutes of 11 May 1918. Ibid., 680. 
54Ibid., 681. 
55Ullman, 1: 173. 
56Ibid., 243, 252. 
57Wilson's decision is presented in an Aide-Memoire dated 17 July 1918. FRUS: 1918, Russia (Washington, DC 1932), 2: 287-90. · 
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Americans, 1,500 Britons, and 1,000 Frenchmen.58 
Any traces of the British policy of dealing with two opposing Russias 
quickly disappeared. The Soviet government refused to allow Allied forces to 
operate in its territory, and on June 28 a British patrol from Murmansk came 
under fire from the Red Army. In Britain, Balfour's belief that uninvited 
intervention would drive the Bolsheviks into the German camp was seen as 
justified. This view, however, was not accurate. Once significant Allied 
landings occurred, the Soviet government knew that any cooperation with these 
forces would be viewed as a casus belli by the Germa,ns. 59 The Soviets therefore 
faced the choice of fighting either the scattered Allied contingents or the large 
and ever-present German army. This decision was simplified as the British and 
French allied themselves with the White Russian counter-revolutionaries. The 
Allies were now not only the weaker threat but also identified with the 
Bolsheviks' enemies in the Civil War, becoming the natural target of the Red 
Army. 
Allied use of White forces grew out of a need to find the troops necessary 
to reconstruct the Eastern front. The shortage of manpower had long plagued 
the French and British. In December 1917 it had been so severe in Britain that 
a desperate "combing-out" of industry was undertaken.60 So by mid-1918 the 
few men available for operations in Russia were those declared fit solely for 
garrison duty. The Allied planners therefore relied on the use of Russians 
58Ullman, 1: 261; M. Heller and A Neckrich, Utopia In Power: The History of the Soviet Union 
from 1917 to the Present (New York 1986), 90. 
59Heller and Neckrich, 89. 
OOUllman, 1: 64. 
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faithful to the Allied cause. 61 It was expected that "the loyal elements of 
Russia'' would gather around the Allied contingents "and fight against Prussian 
domination of their own country."62 General Poole went so far as to declare that 
"[t]he presence of 5,000 Allied troops would ensure the accumulation of 100,000 
Russian troops behind them. "63 However, as most Russians were peasants who 
had had enough of war and did not really care who ruled Russia, recruits were 
scarce. 64 As a result, the only forces available to fight the Germans were those 
already fighting the Bolsheviks. The White Russian counter-revolutionaries 
were eager to declare their undying support for the Allied cause in return for 
military and financial aid. It was inevitable that an alliance with the counter-
revolutionaries would obliterate the distinction between anti-Germanism and 
anti-Bolshevism which had been the basis of Balfour's policy.65 The original 
policy of conducting operations in Russia to fight the Germans had evolved into 
plans to intervene in the Russian Civil War against the Bolsheviks. 
This change also stemmed from the growth of anti-Bolshevism in the 
West. For many in the Allied camp a distinction had never been made between 
fighting the Germans and the Bolsheviks. They believed that the Bolsheviks 
were the instruments of the Germans because the benefits which Germany 
derived from the November revolution were so obvious. Had not the Germans 
themselves transported Lenin to Russia in the famous sealed train like a plague<-
') 
61See Telegram 88, Balfour to Young, 2 July 1918. Lowe and Dockrill, 3: 687. 
62Telegram 1816, Balfour to Reading (Ambassador at Washington), 29 March 1918. Ibid., 3: 
674. 
68War Cabinet minutes, 11 May 1918. Ibid., 3: 677. 
64Ullman, 1: 242; D. Lloyd George, Memoirs of the» Peace Conference (New Haven 1939), 1: 
209-10. (Hereaft.er cited as Peace Conference.) 
65E.H. Carr, The Bolsheuik Reuolution, 1917-1923 (London 1953), 3: 87. 
17 
( 
' 
bacillus? The Times put the case bluntly: 
At the instigation and with the assistance of German agents, the Bolsheviks 
deliberately destroyed the Army, made a separate peace with Germany and 
her allies in breach of Russia's pledges, ... nipped in the bud the promise of 
ordered liberty which the moderate parties had given, and set themselves to 
dissolve the entire fabric of society. 66 
The Morning Post called them "the declared enemies of the Entente powers and 
the open friends of Gerniany."67 The Bolsheviks' publication of secret 
documents between previous Russian governments and the Entente seemed to 
prove the existence of an alliance between Germ.any and the Soviet government. 
While Lenin claimed that this action was designed to prove that the Bolsheviks 
would abolish "secret diplomacy" and "conduct all negotiations absolutely openly 
before the entire people, "68 the portions printed by Pravda and Izvestiia showed 
that the war was being fought for selfish, territorial gain by the western powers. 
It must have seemed the height of understatement in London and Paris when 
Trotsky said that "Germany and Austria-Hungary may try to make use of the 
documents published in order to present the diplomacy of the Central Empires 
in a more advantageous light. "69 
This "open diplomacy" was seen as a form of warfare against the Allies. 
Openly proclaiming their goal of helping "the working class in all lands to 
overthrow the rule of capital and to seize political power", the Bolsheviks aimed 
revolutionary propaganda at the Entente's proletariat. 70 The War Office 
66The Times, 4 June 1918. 
67Morning Post, 9 November 1917. Quoted in S.R. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian 
Revolution, 1917-1924 (Cambridge, MA 1956), 45. 
68Decree on Peace. Degras, 1: 2. 
69Degras, 1: 8. 
70
"Appeal. from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Toiling, Oppressed, and 
Exhausted Peoples of Europe," 19 December 1917. Degras, 1: 19. Also see War Memoirs, 5: 2567. 
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complained that the Soviet government was "endeavouring to tamper with the 
discipline of British troops."71 Propaganda was the Soviet's only effective 
weapon given its military weakness and diplomatic isolation. 72 As Chicherin 
was later to state, "we write fewer notes to governments and more appeals to 
the working classes. ,,73 
The international comm11nity was also infuriated by the Soviet 
government's open proclamation on February 3 'that all state debts had been 
annulled.74 Russia owed Britain alone some 600 million pounds, almost all of 
which were direct state loans between governments. 75 British private loans 
amounted to 17.5 million pounds. The Soviet press welcomed their repudiation, 
declaring that "Russia has paid enough in blood and suffering on the fields of 
battle of this war of international capitalism."76 The diplomatic corps in 
Petrograd was united in its outrage against the Soviet government's action and 
filed a protest with the Commissar of Foreign Affairs on February 12. The 
Allies' representatives claimed the Soviet decree was "without value as far as 
their nationals are concerned" and reserved the right to claim damages at an 
opportune time. 77 
71War Memoirs, 5: 2567. 
72See the "Appeal ... to the Toiling Masses ... on Allied Intervention in Russia," 1 August 1918, Degras, 1: 88-92; and the "Appeal ... to the Workers ... to Protest Against the Blockade of Russia," 18 April 1919, Ibid., 150-54. 
73Quoted by Carr, 3: 89. 
74Translation of decree appears in Telegram 1027, Francis to Lansing, 12 February 1918. 
FRUS, 1918, Russia (Washington, DC 1933), 3: 32-33. 
75Ullman, 1: 69. 
76From the Socia/, Democrat quoted in Telegram 240, Summers (Consul General at Moscow) to Lansing, 13 December 1917. Ibid, 29. 
77Telegram 2360, Francis to Lansing, 12 February 1918. Ibid., 33. 
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Anti-Bolshevism in Britain grew throughout 1918 and reached a new 
height on August 31 when naval attache Captain F.N.A. Cromje was murdered 
by a Bolshevik mob in the British Embassy at Petrograd. After this incident, 
hatred of the Bolsheviks appeared second only to that of the Hun as it was 
called an "abominable outrage" by the foreign secretary. Balfour warned 
Chicherin that if "complete satisfaction" was not given or, if any other British 
subjects were harmed, "His Majesty's Government will hold the members of the 
Soviet government individually responsible and will make every endeavour to 
secure that they shall be treated as outlaws by the governments of civilized 
nations and that no place of refuge shall be left to them. "78 Disgust with the 
Soviet government grew throughout the aut11mn of 1918 as reports of the 
Bolshevik "Terror" were received in the West. 
Since May [1918] the so-called Extraordinary Committee against Counter-
Revolution has conducted an openly avowed campaign of terror. Thousands of 
persons have been s11mmarily shot without even the form of a trial .... The 
situation cries aloud to all who will act for the sake of h11manity.79 
British prisoners in Petrograd were reported to be crammed into small cells 
without food or the most primitive of comforts. 80 Soon stories were circulating 
of a collapsing Bolshevik regime which was venting its brutal passions on the 
helpless population with the help of Chinese mercenaries: "low-class Mongolians 
of desperate character commanded by Chinese and German sergeants. "81 By 
the end of the war the Bolsheviks were believed to have perpetrated every 
78Memorandum 986, Barclay (British Charge' at Washington) to Lansing, 6 September 1918. 
Ibid., 1: 665. 
79Unnumbered telegram, Poole (Consul at Moscow) to Lansing, 3 September 1918. Ibid., 681-82. 
80
"Report of the Netherland Minister relating to conditions in Petrograd" enclosed with 
Telegram 10008, Laughlin (Charge at London) to Lansing, 5 October 1918. Ibid., 677. 
81Telegram 2876, Armour (Second Secretary of Embassy at Petrograd) to Lansing, 21 
September 1918. Ibid., 691. 
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horror that could be conceived. 
The growing confusion of anti-Bolshevism and anti-Gern1anism in the 
West created few problems for the British government during the war. The 
Conservatives and most Labourites agreed that intervention was necessary in 
order to win. The Armistice, however, brought an end to wartime unity and 
reinstituted the old political divisions. Furthermore, this separation between 
the parties was enhanced by the issue of intervention. Both Labour and the 
Tories recognized that the end of the war removed any justification for 
continued military operations in Russia: Germany had been defeated. Yet the 
parties split on what Britain's new Russian policy should be. The resulting 
debate was heated and, at times, vicious as the issue was ideologically charged. 
During the war, the Conservatives whole-heartedly wished the 
destruction of both the Soviet government and the German empire. To the 
Tories, the charges of Bolshevik atrocities merely confmned what they had 
believed all along: the Bolsheviks were barbarians threatening the existence of 
western civilization. The Russian revolutionaries in fact stood in opposition to 
all that the Conservatives held sacred: property, religion, tradition, class. 82 
Thus it was no wonder that Basil Thomson saw this ideology as "a sort of 
infectious disease ... eat[ing] away the fabric of society" until civilization 
collapsed.83 The Conservatives feared that post-war Britain would not be 
immune to the contagion. 
Winston Churchill (a Liberal member of the government) wholly shared 
these views. He was convinced that Bolshevism was a growing threat to 
82Kennan, 214-16. 
83Basil Thomson's quote appears in C.J. Nottingham, "Recasting Bourgeois Britain? The 
British State in the Years Which Followed the First World War," International Review of Social 
History, 31, 3 (1986) :229 
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western democracy and civilization. To him Lenin was the "Grand Repudiator," 
abandoning "God, King, Country, morals," and all that made up the structure of 
society.84 Churchill described the Bolsheviks as "ferocious baboons" capering 
"amid the ruins of cities and the corpses of their victims."85 They were leading 
"a war against civilized society which can never end. They seek as the first 
condition of their being the overthrow and destruction of all existing institutions 
and of every State and Government now standing in the world."86 Although he 
played no role in the wartime evolution of British policy towards the Bolsheviks, 
Churchill became devoted to leading the effort to fight Bolshevism inside Russia 
upon becoming Secretary of State for War in January 1919. Throughout the 
fallowing year, he bombarded Lloyd George and other cabinet members with 
letters and memoranda demanding anti-Bolshevik actions. The prime minister 
called him the "most formidable and irrepressible protagonist of an anti-
Bolshevik war,"87 and at times Lloyd George even thought Churchill's concern 
bordered on obsession.88 Though Churchill's opposition was forceful and noisy, 
he often found himself isolated in the cabinet. 89 Yet the Die-Hards of the 1918 
Parliament found in Churchill a vociferous spokesman for their views on 
Bolshevism. 
Both Churchill and his Tory supporters believed that only continued 
84W.S. Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (London 1929), 75. 
85Quoted by M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill (London 1975), 4: 227. Hereafter cited as 
M. Gilbert, WSC. 
86Ibid., 903. 
87Peace Conference, 1: 214. 
88F. Lloyd George, The Years that are Past (London 1967), 170. Also see M. Gilbert, WSC, 4: 
902-3. 
89K.O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922 
(Oxford 1979), 134-35. Hereafter cited as Morgan, Consensus. Also see Gilbert, WSC, 4: 903. 
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intervention to crush Bolshevism would save Europe and the Empire. 
Moreover, the British government had a moral obligation to continue its support 
for the White forces it had used during the war. The Tory position was 
presented by Lord Milner in a letter to The Ti,mes. Writing in response to 
questions as to why British troops were still in Russia after the Armistice, the 
outgoing secretary of war began by reviewing the course of intervention. He 
stated that troops were originally sent to Russia because "the Bolsheviks ... were 
in fact assisting our enemies in every possible way."90 Intervention had 
succeeded, Milner continued, in its purpose of hastenjng the defeat of Germany. 
As a result of intervention, there were thousands of Russians who had fought on 
the side of the Allies and were now being attacked by the Soviet government. 
How can we, simply because our own immediate purposes have been served, 
come away and leave them to the tender mercies of their and our enemies, 
before they have had time to arm, train, and organize so as to be strong 
enough to defend themselves? It would be an abominable betrayal, contrary to 
every British instinct of honor and h11manity.91 
British troops, Milner continued would therefore have to remain in Russia but 
not "a day longer than is necessary to discharge the moral obligations we have 
incurred." Two months later, as the new head of the war office, Churchill 
basically reiterated Lord Milner's views. 
If Russia is to be saved, as I pray she may be saved, she must be saved by 
Russians .... The aid which we can give to these Russian Armies -- who we do 
not forget were called into the field originally during the German war to some 
extent by our inspiration and who are now engaged in fighting the foul 
baboonery of Bolshevism -- can be given by arms, munitions, equipment, and 
technical services raised upon a voluntary basis. 92 . 
Milner's and Churchill's plans to continue intervention to destroy the 
menace of Bolshevism were wholly at odds with the position of the post-war 
90The Times, 19 December 1918. 
91Jbid. 
92Sp~ech given at Mansion House on 19 February 1919. M. Gilbert, WSC, 4: 257. 
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Labour party. Labour had split on the issue of intervention during the war. 
The trade union majority had supported the government's actions, believing 
simply that, during wartime, military considerations were paramount.93 Using 
a more sophisticated argument, the Fabians also agreed that intervention was 
necessary. For this group, the Bolsheviks had become the unwilling servants of 
the Germans and it was the duty of the Allies to help the Russians save their 
country.94 The Independent Labour Party and other pacifist groups viewed 
Russia as a neutral power which was not to be interfered with. Ca]ling for a 
negotiated peace, they did not accept the argument that military needs justified 
intervention.95 These groups reunited as the war came to an end to oppose a 
policy of massive intervention to crush Bolshevism. 96 With Germany defeated 
there was no longer any reason for British troops to remain in Russia. 
Yet the Labour party was not sure how to deal with the Soviets.97 
Labourites were fascinated by the first full application of socialist principles; 
however, the Bolshevik leaders appeared repugnant and doctrinaire. There 
were also the repeated stories of atrocities committed by the Bolsheviks. Some 
explained these away as the inevitable consequences of revolution and nothing 
worse than what had happened under the tsar. This view was expressed by 
Joseph King in the House of Commons: "I say there is a great deal of cant and 
humbug about ... the Bolshevik terror being the worse terror that the world has 
93Graubard, 58, 62. 
94Jbid., 60-61. 
95Jbid., 58. 
96P. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background lnfiuences on British External 
Policy, 1865-1980 (London 1981), 242. Hereafter cited as Kennedy, Realities. Also see Graubard, 
64; and AJ.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers, paperback ed. (London 1969), 147. 
97Kennan, 216. 
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ever seen. It is not so bad as the terror under the Czar."98 Despite some 
reservations, however, most Labourites agreed that the Soviet government 
deserved support for it had the right enemies.99 In any case, the Russian people 
should have the right of self-determination. 
We really ought to have some assurance that these military operations will 
be brought to a close as soon as possible, that we are not going to interfere 
with the right of the Russians to set up what Government they like, and that 
we are not there to occupy the country .... 100 
Self-determination also appeared as the most economic solution to the problem 
of intervention. 
**** 
Both Labour and the Tories were aware of the fmancial implications of 
their policies. The Labourites believed that a "hands-off' policy toward Russia 
would result in a smaller military budget. The money saved could then be used 
to fund long-awaited social reforms. The minority of Conservatives who 
advocated continued intervention naturally saw things differently. Milner 
claimed, in his letter to The Times, that a sudden withdrawal from Russia would 
result in the unimpeded spread of Bolshevism. If this occurred, the 
consequences "would assuredly involve a far greater strain on the resources of 
the British Empire then our present commitments. "101 The Daily Mail agreed, 
merely adding that chaos in Russia-gave the Germans "an excuse for refusing to 
980fficial Report, Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, Fifth Series, 110: cols. 1749-50, 
31 October 1918. Hereafter cited as HC Deb. 
99Kennan, 216. 
100Joseph King, 110 HC Deb, cols. 2795-96, 13 November 1918. Also see his statement in Ibid., cols. 
3017-19, 14 November 1918, and Arthur Ponsonby's in Ibid., col. 3262, 18 November 1918. Also see the report 
of a Labour party rally in The Times, 2 December 1918. 
101The Times, 19 December 1918. 
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disarm."102 This meant that the troops could not go home and that Britain 
must pay to maintain large armies and fleets. Thus, the economic solution was 
to remain in Russia. 
There was good reason to be concerned with Britain's :financial condition. 
The country found itself increasingly squeezed between a need to cut spending 
on the armed forces and the growing burden of overseas obligations. Continued 
intervention in Russia would only serve to aggravate this situation. Britain's 
money problems were the result of the war. It had cost 9 billion pounds; and 
despite the dramatic rise in the tax rate from ls. 2d. in the pound in 1913 to 6s. 
in 1919, only 28 percent of the cost had been paid through taxation. 103 The 
remaining 7 .2 billion pound deficit had been covered by heavy borrowing from 
London banks and the issuance of war bonds.104 AB a result, the National Debt 
now st.ood eleven times greater than it had before the war. Correspondingly, the 
cost of servicing the debt also rose. In 1913 the government spent 6.1 percent of 
its budget or .8 percent of the gross national product on annual interest 
payments. By 1920 these figures had rocketed to 20.4 percent and 5.4 
percent.105 Particularly gloomy was the report on Britain's fmance accounts for 
the 1918/1919 fiscal year. While the total gross liabilities had risen 1.6 billion 
pounds in the previous year to roughly 7 .5 billion pounds, total gross assets had 
fallen by 29 million pounds to 71.4 million pounds. 106 
102Daily Mail, 19 December 1918. 
103A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (Oxford 1979), 124; B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane, 
Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, Eng. 1962), 429. 
104Kennedy, Realities, 147. 
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Such figures made it painfully evident to the fmancially orthodox that 
Britain now had to live within its means. A program of economic retrenchment 
to secure budgetary stabilization had been followed after the Napoleonic, 
Crimean, and Boer Wars and by 1918 was considered standard practice.107 
Championing this view was a report by the Committee on Currency and Foreign 
Exchanges. Led by Lord Cunliffe, Governor of the Bank of Englan<l from 1913 
until March 1918, the committee reported that "cessation of Government 
borrowings and decreased expenditure both by the Government and by each 
individual member of the nation are the first essentials to recovery."108 These 
opinions were later given greater authority through a declaration by the 
economic council of the Paris peace conference. 
[T]he necessary measures must be ... to balance recurrent Government 
expenditure with national income and to begin at the earliest possible moment 
the reduction of floating debts. The best remedy of all is that debts should be 
reduced out of revenue.109 
The new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, urged that these 
policies be adopted. The government could not continue, as during wartime, to 
act as though there were no limit to available credit. Industry's expansion and 
conversion to peacetime would use up the capital previously loaned to the 
state.110 According to Chamberlain, there just was not enough money around to 
fund reconstruction and to meet all of Britain's military commitments as well. 
The most obvious source of much needed funds was military cutbacks. By 
the end of the war the armed forces consisted of an army with 5.5 million men, a 
107Kennedy, Rea/,ities, 226; M. Beloff, Imperial Sunset (London 1972), 1: 278. 
108Cmd. 464 (1919), Final Report of the Committee on Cun-ency and Foreign Exchanges After 
the War. 
109Cmd. 646 (1920), Declaration by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference on the Economic Conditions 
of the World. 
110P.K Cline, "Reopening the Case of the Lloyd George Coalition and the Postwar Economic 
Transition 1918-1919," Journal of British Studies, 10, 1 (November 1970): 167. 
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Royal Air Force of 20,000 aircraft and 290,000 personnel, and a navy with 
438,000 men and over 750 ships of various classes. 111 While the end of the war 
would certainly bring a reduction in the military and its share of the budget 
(which was 80.6 percent in 1918), 112 it was doubtful that the decline in defense 
expenditure would be sufficient to allow the funding of reconstruction without 
deficit spending. A balanced budget containing large social expenditures had 
been achieved in 1913 when defense had received only 29.9 percent of the 
government's total budget. 113 This level of spending was sufficient to pay for 
imperial policing and a very small expeditionary force; however, the war had 
brought a larger empire as well as European obligations. 
The British Empire had grown through the addition of the former German 
colonies of Tanganyika, Southwest Africa, New Guinea, and Samoa. Britain 
had also acquired extensive mandated areas in the Middle East which proved to 
be expensive dependents. In both Mesopotamia and Palestine, British military 
garrisons were needed to preserve order.114 Meanwhile, Britain still had to 
contend with the continuing dissatisfaction with British rule in Egypt, India, 
and Ireland. The other members of the Empire, the Dominions, had grown more 
independent during the war. As a result, Britain received an ever-decreasing 
amount of economic and military help in ruling and developing the dependent 
territories.115 Britain was therefore left almost alone to maintain the Empire. 
Beyond its imperial obligations, the country also needed men for occupation 
111 Kennedy, Real,ities, 226. 
112Peacock and Wiseman, 186. 
113Jbid. 
114Morgan, Consensus, 118. 
115Beloff, 1: 349. Also see P. Keru1edy, The Rise and Fal,l of British Naval Mastery (New York 1976), 265. 
28 
I 
., r r 
duties in Germany and for stationing in Constantinople to defend the Straits.116 
In addition, there were the operations underway in Russia. 
Unsurprisingly, a review by the general staff of Britain's military position 
proved to be rather gloomy. In comparison with its pre-war commitments, 
Britain's liabilities had increased by thirteen infantry divisions, two cavalry 
divisions, and twenty-six airforce squadrons. Possible reinforcements for 
British overseas possessions meant an additional nine divisions, four cavalry 
brigades, and five airforce squadrons.117 These were resources the army could 
not supply as it was already committed to other tasks. 
[O]wing to the greatly increased area to be controlled, the general 
deterioration of the military situation outside Europe, and in the actual 
conditions of service, our garrisons are everywhere barely sufficient for our 
needs ... and we have no reserves to meet emergencies.118 
Furthermore, the general staff was unsure as to the effect the League of Nations 
would have on British military commitments. The report concluded on a 
depressing note: "Wherever we look we fmd our garrisons beset by potential 
dangers which may far exceed their strength, and in the sum our liabilities are 
so vast, and at the same time so indeterminate, that to assess them must be 
largely a matter of conjecture."119 Surely Joseph Chamberlain's description of 
Britain as the "weary Titan, staggering under the too vast orb of his own fate" 
was never more appropriate. 
Continued intervention in Russia could not but worsen the situation. The 
government was spending close to 6.7 million pounds per month on rather 
116Morgan, Consensus, 118. 
117
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limited operations in Russia with small numbers of British troops.120 How long 
could the government continue this expenditure? One can only imagine the cost 
of intervention on the grand scale -- in both men and money -- to crush 
Bolshevism; and once victory was obtained, what would be the cost of the 
occupation and reconstruction of a country as large as Russia? 
**** 
Though begun for military reasons, British intervention in the Russian 
Civil War had unforseen political and economic effects. Becoming increasingly 
associated with anti-Bolshevism, intervention also became ever more 
ideologically charged. This evolution deepened the political divisions which 
reopened at the end of the war. Filled with a loathing of Bolshevism and 
considering it a threat to civilization itself, the Conservatives -- in particular, 
the Die-Hards -- called for continued efforts to crush "the foul baboonery" of 
Lenin's ideology. This position was in sharp contrast to that of the Labourites 
who considered intervention a war on democracy. Though they did not find the 
Bolsheviks wholly attractive, Labour believed that Britain could better spend its 
energy and money on reconstruction at home. This economic argument held a 
great deal of influence in a country which was so vastly overextended 
financially. The cost of continued and, more significantly, expanded operations 
in Russia could only serve to widen the gap between Britain's capacities and 
commitments. Both these political and financial aspects of Russian policy were 
of great concern to Lloyd George. Somehow he had to find a way to reconcile 
domestic and foreign policy needs. 
12
°This amount was derived from the figures presented by the War Office in Cmd. 395 (1919), 
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Chapter2 
Lloyd George and 
the Cost of Intervention 
British foreign policy during this period was closely influenced by 
domestic considerations. The government's main priority was to tackle the 
appalling problems which afflicted the economy and society in the aftermath of 
World War I. This chapter shows that its efforts to do so were severely 
hampered by the problems caused by intervention and examines Lloyd George's 
methods of formulating foreign policy. 
.. 
**** 
Lloyd George and his government were committed to the reconstruction of 
Britain. The term "reconstruction" had been used since the beginnjng of the war 
and was considered to mean "not so much a question of rebuilding society as it 
was before the war, but of moulding a better world out of the social and 
econom±tionditions which have come into being during the war."121 In practice 
this meant the building of houses for the workers and the reformation of public 
health and education. In the area of health Lord Rhondda (President of the 
Local Government Board) saw 
... grave difficulties resulting from the existing chaos in our health services, 
e.g. in providing medical services for discharged soldiers and their widows and 
orphans, in the obstacles hampering the development of the needed specialist 
services for insured persons, large n11rnbers of whom are discharged soldiers; in the constant drag on the improvement of tuberculosis services; and in the quarrelling over the maternity and infant welfare schemes. 122 
His goal, which was adopted by the government, was to establish a central 
121Cd. 9005 (1918), Report of War Cabinet for 1917. A Marwick, The Deluge (New York 1965), 239-40. 
122 Ibid., 240-41. 
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Ministry of Health to replace the "two or three separate and competing 
Government Departments, which at present separately supervise various 
elements in the national health problem."123 Educational reform was put in the 
hands of H.A.L. Fisher, President of the Board of Education. He saw that 
reform was needed "to repair the intellectual wastage ... caused by the war" and 
to put "a prompt end to [the] evil" of juvenile employment.124 In July 1918 his 
Education Bill was passed. Among other reforms, it raised the minimum 
leaving age to fourteen, abolished all fees in public elementary schools, and 
increased teachers' salaries. The government's ultimate aim, however, was a 
comprehensive system which would give all children the opportunity to pursue 
the education best suited to their talents. The popular image of reconstruction 
was dominated by the campaign to build houses for the working-class. Suffering 
and social dislocation were nowhere more apparent than in the slums.125 Low-
cost housing had always been scarce as private contractors were loath to build 
in areas which did not promise a quick return through rents. The wartime 
shortages of men and materials aggravated this problem by bringing a halt to 
building maintenance and construction. AB a solution, the wartime Housing 
Advisory Panel decided that the government should build a minimum of 300,000 
houses within the first year of peace. However, many thought this figure was 
far too low. The National Housing and Town Planning Council thought at least 
800,000 new houses needed to be built, the Labour party demanded a million.126 
Housing and the other reforms would certainly cost a great deal, but Lloyd 
1231bid., 241. 
1241bid., 244. 
125P. Abrams, "The Failure of Social Reform: 1918-1920," Past and Present, 24 (April 1963): 44. 
1261bid., 43. 
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George believed such expenditures were wholly warranted. 
Reconstruction was important to the prime minister for several reasons. 
Foremost was his belief that the British people deserved it because of their 
conduct during the war. In the House of Commons, Lloyd George declared that 
the government would "see that ... [the people] suffer no privation" because of the 
many "sacrifices which they have made for their native land."127 He repeated 
this pledge of a better standard of living for all Britons throughout the election 
campaign of November/December 1918: 
The housing? It must be a national task .... Wages, which have been forced up 
by the war, must not be permitted to drop to the point where the strength of 
the worker cannot be maintained in efficiency ... the health of the people must 
be the special concern of the State.128 
Conservative-voting clerks and Labour-voting miners agreed with the view that 
"nothing but immeasurable improvements [ would] ever justify all the waste and 
11nfairness" of the war.129 Having always been sensitive to public opinion and a 
champion of 'New Liberalism," the prime mjnjster was more than eager to 
promote reconstruction. 
Lloyd George also feared that a failure to introduce adequate reforms 
would lead to working-class unrest and a flirtation with Bolshevism. 130 In 
mid-1917 a government commission had determined that while most workers 
were not entertaining ideas of revolution, they did believe "that there has been 
inequality of sacrifice, that the Government has broken solemn pledges, that the 
127112 HC Deb, cols. 68-69, 12 February 1919. 
128The Times, 18 November 1918. Also see his speeches reported in Ibid., 13 and 25 November 1918. 
129Norman Chamberlain to Neville Chamberlain. M. Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (New 
York 1966), 21; Kennedy, Realities, 238. Also see the editorial, "Reaction In Ourselves," in The 
Daily Mail, 27 November 1918. 
130G. Schmidt, "Wozu noch 'politische Geschichte'? Zurn. Verhlltnis von Innen- und 
Aussenpolitik am Beispiel der englischen Friedensstrategie 1918/1919," Aus Politik Und Zeit 
Geschichte, B 17n5 (26 April 1975): 39. 
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Trade Union officials are no longer to be relied upon, and that there is a woeful 
uncertainty as to the industrial future. "131 It was feared that, once the unifying 
factor of the war was removed, a social crisis of a greater magnitude than that of 
the 1910-1914 period would erupt.132 This view was reflected in a statement by 
Beatrice Webb: 
[There is] a working-class seething with discontent, and a ruling class with 
all its traditions and standards topsy-turvy, ... no citizen knows what is going to 
happen to himself or his children, or to his own social circle, or to the state or 
to the Empire. 133 
Some were even asking how long it would be before there was a Soviet in 
London: ''Will it be six months or a year?"134 Surely, the time did not seem far 
off as trade unionists were heard cheering the Bolsheviks and talking about 
"shak[ing] the very foundations of society."135 From the beginning of the 
election campaign, Lloyd George spoke of a "revolutionary spirit" as being in the 
air. This growing radicalism, he believed, had to be redirected. 
Properly used, there is value in that spirit .... What it needs is wise direction. 
The revolutionary spirit must be combated with the spirit which has won the 
war -- the spirit of national unity, of cooperation, of sacrifice .... 
... The watchword of the Government is progress, wise progress. Nothing else 
will save the State, or the Empire, or the world.136 
By a national effort to help the underfed, ill-housed, overworked people of 
Britain, the just grievances of the lower classes could be met and civil 
disturbances avoided. This was essentiallly a policy of appeasement which 
181Cd. 8696 (1917-1918), 17 July 1917, Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest. 
Summary of the Reports of the Commission. 
182Schmidt, 38. 
133Diary entry for 4 November 1918, Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1912-1924, ed. M.I. Cole (London 1952), 133. 
Hereafter cited as Webb Diary. 
184Webb Diary (11 November 1919), 136. Also see The New Statesman, 12, 296 (7 December 
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185J.H. Thomas at an Albert Hall rally. The Times, 4 November 1918. 
186Speech given before Lloyd George's Liberal supporters. The Times, 13 November 1918. 
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robbed the radicals of an excuse for the destruction of the existing social 
fabric. 137 Austen Chamberlain agreed with Lloyd George's views. He believed 
reconstruction was necessary to avoid "a wave of Bolshevism" and saw social 
reform as a ''necessary measure for social security."138 
The institution of reforms would also help make the Liberal party more 
attractive to the working-class and thus meet the increasing threat of the 
Labour party. Even before the end of Lib-Labism in 1909, the Liberals had been 
losing the working-class vote.139 H.H. Asquith's abandonment of New 
Liberalism in 1914 to fight a "liberal" war without "war socialism," only served 
to strengthen the workers' view of the Liberals as members of the Old Guard 
and the Labourites as their true champions.140 Wartime also saw a great 
increase in trade union membership and thereby the Labour party's coffers. 
Most importantly, the 1918 Representation of the People Act had increased 
industrial working-class representation in the electorate by removing all 
property qualifications for male voters over the age of twenty-one and 
enfranchising all women over thirty. No longer confmed to the electoral support 
of largely lower middle and artisan classes, Labour could now fight in many 
more constituencies with hopes for victory.141 The Labour party's threat 
became quite real in November 1918 when an Emergency Labour Party 
Conference voted to "terminate conditions under. which the party entered the 
137Schmidt, 36. 
138A Chamberlain, Down the Years (London 1935), 138. 
139See D. Powell, "The New Liberalism and the Rise of Labour, 1866-1906," Historical, Journal, 
29, 2 (1986): passim. 
140P.F. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Libera/,ism (Cambridge, Eng. 1971), 394. 
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coalition."142 Labour ministers were called upon to leave either the government 
or the party. Labour had decided to be in opposition to the Lloyd George 
_) 
Coalition and to field its own candidiates. 
It was not only the growth of the Labour party but also internal divisions 
within the Liberal party that prompted Lloyd George to continue his coalition 
with the Conservatives. The ouster of Asquith in December 1916 and the 
Maurice Debate of 1917 both served to split the Liberals between Asquith's Wee 
Frees and the Lloyd George Liberals. Since Lloyd George had only a 
rudimentary party machine and was unable to form a popular front with Labour 
or heal the rift with Asquith, he became dependent upon the Conservatives to 
remain in power. 143 Such a position, however, did.not dismay Lloyd George. 
Many times in the past he had sought to build coalitions with the opposition to 
put aside petty partisanships and to gain cooperation in passing reforms. 144 A 
glowing account of this approach was put forth by Lloyd George's second wife 
Francis Stevenson: "He was for policies rather than parties -- for measures in 
defence of the underdog whatever party would carry them out. That was why he 
was so exasperating to members of his own party at times."145 Therefore it was 
not surprising to hear the prime minister calling for a consensus of opinion so 
that reform would not be blocked. He feared a Parliament which would hamper 
reconstruction plans "through the selfishness of interests or the factions of 
142The Times, 15 November 1918. 
cl 143AJ. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at 
Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York 1967), 136-37. 
144KO. Morgan, "Lloyd George's Premiership: A Study In 'Prime Ministerial Government'," 
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partisans."146 With Labour in opposition and the support of the Wee Frees in 
question, the continuation of the coalition with the Conservative party appeared 
the best way to ensure a broad base of support for reconstruction. He called 
upon the Tories to remember "the traditions that made Mr. Disraeli in his best 
days plead ... for a mjujmum wage, for better housing, for shorter hours, and for 
making the health of the people a national concem."147 The problem that Lloyd 
George faced was that not all Conservatives thought that the coalition should be 
continued. 
The Conservatives had done well out of the war. The 1915 Coalition, the 
1916 Lloyd George Coalition, and the split of the Liberal party had resulted in a 
Tory predominance in the government.148 This tended to strain inter-party 
relations. Tied as they were to Lloyd George, the Conservative members felt 
frustrated at having power but only a limited ability to exercise it. 149 The 
Liberals were still the main enemy despite the political truce, and the coalition 
was never a focus of backbench loyalty. Also, the party had gained a more 
widespread following throughout the country.150 The Conservatives therefore 
had good reason to believe that they would be victorious in a straight fight with 
the Liberals and Labour. Since 1905 the Conservative party had been 
struggling to return to power and 1918 seemed the year to reap the fruits of its 
labor. So, when the war ended, many Conservatives thought the party should 
break with the coalition and fight for a wholly Tory government. 
146Lloyd George's speech at Central Hall, Westminster. The Times, 18 November 1918. 
147Jbid. 
148Kennedy, Rea/,ities, 155-56. Also see Churchill, 23. 
149J. Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Ba/,dwin, 1902-40 (New York 1978), 134, 138. 
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The Conservative leadership, however, wanted to continue the coalition. 
The alliance with Lloyd George had produced a certain momentum and loyalty 
of its own.151 Also, many believed that a coalition government was preferable to 
one populated with Tory squires. Most of all, the leadership recognized that 
times had changed.152 Bonar Law put this very frankly in a letter to Arthur 
Balfour: "I am perfectly certain ... that our Party on the old lines will never have 
any future again in this country."153 The increase in working-class 
representation and its demands for reform meant that an alliance with Lloyd 
George and his Liberal supporters would be necessary to meet the increased 
threat of the Labour party and the trade unions. Only a government with wide 
support could institute the necessary reforn1s "in a way as little revolutionary as 
possible."154 They shared the view, later expressed by Lloyd George, that the 
real danger was not revolution but reaction: "Revolution I am not afraid of. 
Bolshevism I am not afraid of. It is reaction that I am afraid of."155 
Those Tories who most wanted to break with Lloyd George were also the 
most reactionary. They were anti-Labour and anti-Bolshevik and did not 
believe in appeasing either group. Reform, in their opinion, should be limited 
and conservative.156 The international threat to parliamentary democracy 
residing in Russia should simply be stamped out. The issue of intervention 
therefore was a source of contention within the Conservative party. So, in order 
1511bid., 132-33. 
152Kennedy, Real,ities, 237; Ramsden, 116. 
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to keep these members faithful to the coalition and its plans for reform, the 
Conservative leadership had to seek a Russian policy which continued British 
support of the White Russian counter-revolutionaries. However, this would 
have to be a moderate level of support so as not to alienate the Liberal element 
of the coalition. 
At no time was the coalition a monolith of national unity, and some effort 
was needed to keep Coalition Liberals in the fold. Liberals recognized that 
Lloyd George was dependent upon the Conservatives to remain in office and 
many of the prim.en minister's supporters still hoped for a reunited Liberal party. 
Though Lloyd George declared that he was wholeheartedly Liberal -- "I was 
raised in Liberalism. From the old leaders of Liberalism I learnt my faith .... I 
cannot leave Liberalism." -- they were loath to join him and suffer 
"excommunication" from the official Liberal party organization.157 During the 
election campaign, Asquith and his supporters tended to support the Wilsonian 
position on foreign affairs, including the president's calls for a League of 
Nations and self-detern1ination for Russia. 158 An interventionist policy towards 
Russia would therefore be a propitious excuse not to join the coalition. The 
Liberal candidate could go before his constituency and say he had acted on 
principle. 
The horrors of the war had shattered popular confidence in the "old 
diplomacy" of secret treaties, imperialism, and arms-races. Much of the British 
populace called for a "new diplomacy" which championed national self-
determination and the rational and pacific settlement of international disputes 
157Quoted in The Times, 13 November 1918; Blake, 393. 
158Mayer, 35. Also see Asquith's speech before the Council of London Liberal Federation in The 
Times, 19 November 1918. 
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(as through the League ofNations).159 Naturally, politicians began to cast their 
foreign policy views in moral terms. Therefore, to keep Liberals loyal to Lloyd 
George and the coalition, the government.had to put forth a morally justifiable 
Russian policy: i.e., one which called for Russian self-determination and a 
renunciation by the British of the :use of force against the Soviet government. 
Intervention was also to play a role in the general election as it became a 
weapon used by Labour against the coalition. In January 1918 the Labour 
II 
' 
party had adopted a new constitution which called for the social, economic, ahd 
constitutional reforms which the bulk of the electorate demanded. 160 In the 
domestic sphere, Labour could therefore stand toe-to-toe with the government 
during the campaign. However, foreign affairs were another matter. During 
the war, the Independent Labour Party and the Union for Democratic Control 
elements of the party had acquired the stigma of being pacifist which was often 
equated with being pro-German or Bolshevik. As Lloyd George declared in his 
famous election-eve speech at Camberwell, "The Labour party is being run by 
the extreme pacifist, Bolshevist group ... Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Snowden, 
Mr. Smillie, and others."161 More damaging to the party's chances of electoral 
success was the fact that coalition candidates could campaign as the men who 
had won the war. Arthur Henderson was reported to be "in the depths of 
depression" over the, party's prospects in the up-coming election, believing that 
the election "will return him [Lloyd George] to power as 'the man who won the 
war' and who alone can be trusted with reconstruction."162 Some thought the 
159K.ennedy, Rea/,ities, 26; Idem., Strategy, 16, 26. 
160C.L. Mowat, Britain between the Wars, 1918-1940 (London 1955), 18-19. 
161The Times, 14 December 1918. 
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situation so desperate that they recommended staying in the coalition. At a 
meeting of the Labour Party Executive, J.R. Clynes (the government's Food 
Controller), "threatened that all candidates who did not get the 'Lloyd George 
letter' would be swept into oblivion and that the Labour Party would be fmally 
smashed."163 How could Labour combat this great store of prestige?164 The 
government's weak point in foreign affairs was Russia. Where was the victory 
there? Why were British troops still under enemy fire? This last question was 
taken up by Joseph King in the Commons. 
Are we to send now, when the War is over, 60,000 men to spend three or four 
months at Archangel in the cold of winter -- and for what? ... I protest, on behalf 
of the men who are there, against ... [the] endangering and J>laying and 
gambling with the lives of British soldiers when the war is over. 1 
If Labour could fan this spark into a bonfire, it could redirect the voters' 
attention from the government's success to its failure. "The indignation of the 
people will be very great," Arthur Ponsonby said in the House of Commons, if 
they "believe that our soldiers will be sent out to the Arctic regions in winter for 
the sake of stirring up strife against" the Bolsheviks.166 In this way, real 
damage could be inflicted on the coalition's campaign. Indeed, in some closely 
contested constituencies, it might prove to be the margin of victory as the issue 
appealed to public opinion. 
Ponsonby's view certainly appeared correct because many Britons would 
not support a decision to maintain British troops in Russia, let alone new 
military operations. War in Russia would mean "hundreds of thousands of 
163Jbid., (7 November 1918), 134. 
164tfhe measure of Lloyd George's confidence was shown on December 15. He said that if he did 
not get a majority of 120, he would "feel badly treated." Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace 
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British lives" and the British public which had "lost enough blood in a good 
cause does not want to lose any more in a bad one."167 After four years of total 
war, with 750,000 dead and 1,700,000 wounded, the populace fled from the idea 
of war for any purpose. 168 Besides, had Britain not just won the "war to end all 
war?" The war had left psychological scars on almost every family in Britain 
regardless of geography or class. All sought the immediate return of the troops 
to their homes, flooding The Daily Mail ("The Soldier's Paper") with letters 
complaining of the slowness of demobilization.169 Correspondingly, the soldiers 
clamored to return home. Having survived the horrific battles of the Western 
front, they had no desire to die in Russia. All the troops said they wanted was 
to "Get into civvies quick, and then have a blinkin' good Christmas."17° Closely 
allied with the growing anti-militarism was the unwillingness of the people to 
pay for a war against the Bolsheviks. The rate of taxation had reached an 
unprecedented level and was a burden that no one wished to bear now that the 
war was over. The British people therefore were not likely to support further 
efforts in Russia but rather to call for reductions in defense expenditures. 
Such views were wholly in accord with those of Lloyd George and his 
supporters. The fmancial burden of intervention would certainly hamper 
reconstruction and the post-war economic transition, resulting in greater 
unemployment and an ever greater radicalization of the populace. These 
conditions would be exacerbated by the inability to demobilize significant 
portions of the army. The already restless troops would fmd the slowness of 
167The New Statesman, 12, 298 (21 December 1918): 232. 
168Kennedy, Strategy, 151, 241. 
169See The Daily Mail, 9 and 11 December 1918. 
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their release unbearable and might refuse t.o follow orders. Plans for economic 
recovery, and thus social peace, were therefore closely linked to an efficient 
reduction in the army's size. The interconnection between demobilization and 
economic transition was presented by Winston Churchill while he was still at 
the Ministry of Munitions. "The victory will be absolutely barren if we are not 
able to bring our soldiers home to active conditions of employment" and to deal 
fairly with the civilian war-workers so as "to leave no legitimate feeling of 
soreness or resentment behind."171 The government's plans for demobilization 
were presented by Dr. Christopher Addison (Minister of Reconstruction) in the 
House of Commons on November 12. First to be released from the army were 
the "demobilisers" who would staff the greatly expanded system of labor 
exchanges. They were to help in the period of readjustment from a wartime to a 
peacetime economy. Returning soldiers would receive twenty-one weeks of 
unemployment donation, while civilian workers would get thirteen weeks in 
order to ease the hardships of this transition.172 Next to be released were the 
"pivotal men" who were considered vital to the restart of industry. Also eligible 
for early demobilization were the so-called "slip men." These were soldiers who 
could produce a letter from their former employer saying that they had a job 
awaiting them when they were released from the service. Addison clearly held 
the principle that demobilization must be guided by the requirements of 
industry. He believed this was necessary for as he said before the House of 
Commons, "the most important question before the country is the question of 
171Jbid., 9 November 1918. These concerns were also addressed during a long debate in the 
House of Lords on 11 November 1918. See Official, Report, Parliamentary Debates: House of 
Lords, Fifth Series, 31: cols. 1122-48. 
172Addison's report is in 110 HC Deb, cols. 2591-2615. Also see the statement issued by the 
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reconstruction. "178 
The prime minister believed that defence cuts and demobilization could 
occur only when Europe was truly at peace. He therefore sought a moderate 
peace (e.g.' neither politically nor economically harsh) which would bring the 
defeated powers back into the comity of nations and the establishment of a . 
11nited Europe held together by conference diplomacy rather than balance of 
power politics.174 Along with a policy of political conciliation, Lloyd George also 
followed the Liberal tradition that free trade (or at least, freer trade) would 
promote international commerce and thus 11njty. This economic appeasement, 
by raising standards of living in the battered and exhausted nations of Europe, 
would provide greater domestic stability by reducing disaffection and 
resentments. Lloyd George's Russian policy was an integral part of his attempt 
to form a post~war settlement based upon political and economic appeasement. 
He was convinced that "world peace was unattajnable" while the Russian 
Civil War raged and "that immense country was left outside the Covenant of 
Nations."175 As he told the House of Commons, "Not only is Russia a source of 
unrest and disturbance to all its neighbors ... but a settlement of the Russian 
problem is essential to the reconstruction of the world."176 Russia would be a 
market for recovering British and European industries and also a vast 
173110 HC Deb, col. 2614, 12 November 1918. 
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storehouse of food and raw material. The absence of Russian commodities, 
Lloyd George argued, was the reason for the post-war inflation "and high prices 
are undoubtedly ... the most dangerous form of Bolshevik propaganda." 177 So, for 
both economic and political reasons, the prime minister sought some sort of 
rapprochement with the Soviet government. 
Lloyd George had long considered the Bolsheviks to be the de facto rulers 
of Russia. He reasoned that "although the vast majority of the people were not 
Communists, they preferred Bolshevik rule to that of the supporters of the old 
regime, and that they were not prepared to join in any military enterprises 
designed to restore the old conditions."178 Personally, Lloyd George regarded 
Lenin as "the biggest man in politics" as he "had conceived and carried out a 
great economic experiment."179 The prime minister, however, believed that the 
experiment had failed and that Lenin would modify his plans and govern Russia 
by other means. The Soviet government was therefore here to stay and Allied 
intervention was a lost cause. In fact, all the Allies were doing was prolonging a 
war whose outcome had already been determined. They· did so in two ways. 
One was through the financial and material support given to the various anti-
Bolshevik White forces in Russia (money which could be better used in Britain 
to further reconstruction and ease the people's tax burden); and the other was 
by bolstering support for the Bolsheviks through the presence of Allied troops in 
Russia (a measure unpopular with British troops). This roused "the patriotic 
sen~nt of the country" and brought it to the 8:id of the Soviet government. 180 
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Lloyd George believed that the form of Russia's government was a matter for 
the Russians to settle on their own. It was "an impertinence and an outrage for 
the Allies to attempt to impose an objectionable Government upon them by force 
of arms. "181 This was especially so, he argued, after the Entente had just fought 
a war in part to establish the right of self-determination. The solution as Lloyd 
! ~~-
George viewed the problem of intervention was to leave the Russians to 
determine their own fate. The Allies would discharge their obligations to the 
White forces by seeing that "they were sufficiently well equipped to enable them 
to hold their own and to try conclusions with the Bolsheviks on their claim to 
represent the people of Russia. "182 Then Allied forces could withdraw and await 
the outcome of the battle. 
**** 
This seeming abandonment of the anti-Bolsheviks would surely not be 
popular with the Tory Die-Hards, and any mention of conciliatory overtures 
towards the Soviet government would be met with outrage. Lloyd George's 
great challenge therefore was to accomplish his goal of ending intervention 
while ensuring at least the tacit loyalty of these Conservatives to the coalition. 
Fortunately, the prime minister was well suited to undertake this task. Called 
by Churchill "the greatest master of the art of getting things done and of putting 
things through that I ever knew," Lloyd George was often attacked as being 
unscrupulous, opportunistic, and lacking principle. 183 This opinion of Lloyd 
George was well expressed by Harold Nicolson: 
181Jbid., 209. Also see F. Lloyd George, 170. 
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I never thought of him as wicked. He had a moral purpose and his objectives 
were good and unselfish. But he had no moral sense, no moral discipline, no 
sense of moral method appropriate to bring his moral purpose to fruition. 
That's what I found so hard to take.184 
As noted by Nicolson, it was Lloyd George's methods rather than his goals which 
were the object of attack. 
In part, the prime minister's aims evoked less criticism because no one 
was exactly sure what they were, in~luding Lloyd George. A.J.P. Taylor has 
commented that the prime minister "was happiest when improvising policies 
toward an unknown goal," but this was a harshjudgement.185 B.B. Gilbert has 
more aptly described the prime minister as "a manufacturer's representative 
marketing a commodity or a process he did not yet possess. "186 This really 
meant that Lloyd George had broad policy goals or an outline of what he wanted 
to accomplish but had "no plan whatever as to how he intended to proceed."187 
Such a position gave him certain political advantages which were noted in The 
New Statesman: 
Charges of inexactitude which would destroy other men fall flat when they 
are directed against him [Lloyd George], since no one dreams of expecting him 
to be exact. This particular sort of invulnerability is undoubtedly one of his 
greatest political assets .... 1ss 
The generality of his goals allowed the prime minister a great flexibility of 
method. He could afford to take roundabout paths to rapprochement and seize 
any opportunities which would advance him toward his goal: "I was never in 
favour of costly frontal attacks, either in politics or war, if there was a way 
184Quoted in B.B. Gilbert, David Lloyd George (Colllmbus, OH 1987), 17. 
185K.O. Morgan, Lloyd George (London 1974), 8. 
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round."189 He therefore kept his objectives to himself and sometimes openly 
denied them. He would lead his opponents along deceiving paths until one day 
they would realize they had been led in a direction opposite to their wishes. As 
Taylor has stated, "Men do not like being cheated even for the most admirable 
cause."190 Moreover, these methods created an "atmosphere of suspicion" and 
the impression that Lloyd George "was pursuing a personal policy which he was 
unwilling either to avow or to abandon."191 Having to handle all issues 
personally, Lloyd George gained the reputation of being a dictator. As Maurice 
Hankey (head of the War Cabinet Secretariat) once commented on Lloyd 
George, 
The mistake he is making is to try to absorb too much into his hands. He 
seems to have a sort of lust for power; ignores his colleagues, or tolerates them 
in an almost disdainful way, and seems more and more to ass11me the attitude 
of a dictator. He takes but little advice, and even Philip Kerr and I have few 
opportunities to coach him.192 
He demanded that all "first class policy" matters be submitted to him before 
they were brought up in the cabinet.193 
Lloyd George's personal direction of policy was made possible, in part, 
through the War Cabinet and other institutions he created after replacing 
Asquith in 1916. Tired of Asquith's ineffective leadership and a war waged by 
separate departments, Lloyd George wanted to assert strong leadership and 
unify the war effort in a directorate of "a small number of men with no 
189Quoted in A.J.P. Taylor, Lloyd George: Rise and Fall (London 1961), 33. 
190Jbid. 
191H. Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925 (London 1934), 57. 
192Hankey diary, 25 December 1918. S. Roskill, Hankey, Man of SecT"ets (London 1972), 2: 39. 
193Lloyd George to Churchill, 18 January 1919. M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Compo.nion 
to Volume 4, Part 1, Documents (London 1977), 461. Hereafter cited as Churchill Papers. 
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departmental obligations to direct the affairs of the Empire during the war."194 
The result was the five-man War Cabinet. Ruling over the resulting jumble of 
ad hoc committees and confusion of personnel, Lloyd George became the center 
of power and decision making.195 Naturally, this meant that Lloyd George had 
personal control over foreign policy. In fact, his new foreign secretary, Arthur 
Balfour, was excluded from the War Cabinet though he frequently attended 
meetings. Yet any advice tendered by the foreign secretary did not need to be 
accepted because the War Cabinet made all fmal decisions, and Lloyd George 
was its leader. As Arthur Henderson would later write, "L.G. was the War 
Cabinet and nobody else really counted. "196 
Created along with the War Cabinet in December 1916, the War Cabinet 
Secretariat was charged with the duties of keeping cabinet minutes and setting 
agendas. Yet it proved itself to be much more than this. The Cabinet 
Secretariat was Lloyd George's department, with Hankey answerable only to 
him. Thus, the prime minister could privately order the presence of selected 
individuals at cabinet meetings and decide what issues were to be discussed on 
a given day.197 Such powers allowed him to fill meetings with personnel and 
experts favoring his views or to arrange the absence of an opposing minister. 
Either tactic would provide a minimum of opposition to his views in cabinet 
meetings and provide Lloyd George with continued control over policy. In fact, 
he employed these methods to such an extent that the cabinet appeared to 
194R.M. Warman, "The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 
1916-1918," Historical Journal, 15, 1 (1972): 135. 
195Morgan, Premiership, 133-34 and passim. 
196Ibid., 130. 
197 Ibid., 134. 
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dissolve into a series of conversations between selected ministers. Alfred Mond, 
a later Minister of Health, complained about this state of affairs and of the 
increasing irrelevance of the cabinet. 
It is very difficult for a Member of the Cabinet to know at the present time 
whether questions are to be considered Cabinet questions or not. Sometimes 
questions are discussed and subsequently decisions come to us without the 
Cabinet being again consulted ... The principle of collective responsibility on 
these subjects becomes almost impossible to maintain.198 
Thus it was not surprising that Lloyd George asked Hankey "how to manage 
War Cabinet approval" of Eric Geddes' acceptance of the cabinet position of 
director of demobilization.199 
The Foreign Office also was not pleased with the effects of the Cabinet 
Secretariat on the conduct of foreign affairs. Primarily, this was because the 
secretariat took over many of the duties reserved for the Foreign Office staff. 
Hankey became responsible not only for the recording and circulation of minutes 
of international conferences, but also his department was directed to organize 
and conduct these conferences including the provision of accommodations for the 
delegates.200 In a more unofficial capacity, the secretariat became a regular, 
inforn1al channel of communication between Lloyd George and foreign 
correspondents. Often letters were sent on to Lloyd George by Hankey with 
"worth reading" or "amusing and interesting" marked upon them for the prime 
minister's benefit.201 Hankey, in fact, became a regular advisor to Lloyd George 
on foreign policy issues and helped in drafting the Fontainebleau 
t 
198Ibid. ,148. 
199Hankey diary, 18 December 1918. Roskill, 2: 36. 
200A.J. Sharp, "The Foreign Office In Eclipse 1919-1922," History, 61,202 (June 1976): 209. 
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Memorandum. 202 
Lloyd George's main source of advice, however, was his personal 
secretariat also known as the Garden Suburb. Gaining its name from the 
temporary huts in the garden of 10 Downing Street in which it was housed 
during the war, the prime minister's secretariat was set up as a personal 
intelligence department. 203 As such, the secretaries were given full access to 
department heads and their subordinates as well as all War Cabinet minutes 
and departmental papers. These wide powers were necessary for the secretariat 
to prepare weekly reports on the extent to which the decisions of the War 
Cabinet had been carried out and to conduct special inquiries ordered by the 
prime minister. This group originally consisted of five members.204 One was 
the millionaire, Welsh member of Parliament, David Davies, who advised Lloyd 
George on matters of war and munitions. Another Welshman was Joseph 
Davies, a commercial statistician, appointed to deal with commodities and 
shipping. W.G.S. Adams was an Oxford don with progressive views who was 
put in charge of treasury and labor affairs. The other millionaire in the group 
was Waldorf Astor. He was owner of the Observer and a left-wing Tory, 
overseeing liquor control for Lloyd George. Most influential of them all was 
Philip Kerr, the editor of the Round Table and past member of the Milner 
Kindergarten. Kerr specialized in foreign and colonial matters and became 
Lloyd George's closest advisor. 
Besides giving advice on foreign policy, Kerr obtained information from 
202M. Hankey, The Supreme Control at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (London 1963), 97-98. 
203J.A Turner, "The Formation of Lloyd George's 'Garden Suburb': 'Fabian-Like Milnerite 
Penetration'?," Historical Journal, 20, 1 (1977): 176. 
204Jbid., 177-78; Morgan, Premiership, 135-36. 
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foreign representatives and sometimes participated in negotiations. 205 In the 
winter of 1917/1918, Kerr undertook missions to Switzerland to investigate 
peace overtures from Count Mensdorff, former Austro-Hungarian ambassador in 
London.206 Also during the war, he gauged American reactions to Irish 
conscription and held secret negotiations with Kerensky.207 At the Paris peace 
conference, Kerr was omnipresent, holding private talks and even drafting 
treaties.208 Naturally, the Foreign Office took offense at Kerr's activities. AB 
early as June 1917, Lord Hardinge was complaining that "we have two 
diplomacies -- one of the Foreign Office and the other 'amateur' -- running side 
by side."209 Other members of the government also protested. Most vocal was 
Churchill who told Lord Riddell: 
At present the P.M. is conducting the business of the Foreign Office with 
Kerr's assistance. I don't think that any man who does not hold a leading 
position in the State should be permitted to exercise so much influence as Kerr 
does.210 
Kerr was not the only individual the Foreign Office was concerned about. 
The prime minister himself had a great enthusiasm for personal or summit 
diplomacy. This was not surprising given Lloyd George's past and personal 
style. Lloyd George's love of summit diplomacy was largely the result of his 
political background.211 Before becoming prime minister in 1916, he had held 
205Sharp, 208-09. 
206w arm.an, 144. 
207Morgan, Premiership, 136. 
208Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Old Diplomacy (London 194 7), 241. 
209w arm.an, 15 7. 
210Ridde.ll Diary (22 July 1920), 222-23. 
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no post dealing with foreign affairs. The closest he had come was a brief stint as 
Secretary of State for War. Therefore, he had little practical experience in 
foreign policy and fell back upon his methods of dealing with domestic issues. 
Lloyd George's political style was an interpersonal one in which he would meet 
face to face with his opponents to charm and beguile them into a settlement. 
This may explain Keynes' description of Lloyd George as a "syren" and 
"enchantress. "212 This tactic results in a propensity for summit diplomacy both 
at home and abroad: just as Bonar Law, Henderson, and others constituted 
domestic politics so Clemenceau, Wilson, and others constituted international 
politics.213 It was all the same game to Lloyd George, only the players were 
different. 
Of course, Lloyd George did not view matters in this way. Instead, he 
would say, "Diplomats were invented simply to waste time. It is simply a waste 
of time to let [important matters] be discussed by men who are not authorized to 
speak for their countries."214 He would call himself (quite rightly) "a constant 
advocate of negotiation by conference in preference to negotiation by notes. "215 
In a letter to Curzon, Lloyd George made clear his plans for the conduct of post-
war diplomacy:· "I very much pref er then in spite of possible delay that great 
questions be discussed between principals, meeting alternatively in London, 
Paris, and Italy and that details should be settled by communication between 
the Foreign Offices."216 
212J.M. Keynes, Essays in Biography, ed. G. Keynes (London 1961), paperback ed., 35-36. 
213R.H. IBiman,Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921 (Princeton 1973), 3: 464. 
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Lloyd George's personal methods of foreign policy brought little comment 
from Arthur Balfour. His policy towards Lloyd George was "a free hand for the 
Little Man."217 There were a number of explanations for Balfour's pliancy. One 
was that he made a "distinction between what he considered to be his business 
and what he did not."218 During the war and the Paris peace conference, 
Balfour considered foreign policy to be the business of Lloyd George and the War 
Cabinet. AB such, he would state both sides of an argument and let Lloyd 
George make the decision: 
He gave the impression of a man who thought it really did not matter so 
much which of the two courses you took so long as you stuck to it afterwards. 
So therefore it was for us to choose and he would abide by the decision.219 
Like Lloyd George, Balfour "suffered from no taboos about official routine."220 
Certainly, such a view would go far towards harmonious relations with the 
prime minister. Balfour's age and health have also been given as an 
explanation for his subservience to Lloyd George. Sixty-eight years of age upon 
taking office in 1916 and in poor health, he was often absent from the Foreign 
Office, allowing Cecil to act as his deputy and Hardinge to do the routine 
work.221 Perhaps the most important cause of Balfour's "free hand" policy was 
his view of the prime minister. He believed that Lloyd George was the only man 
who could win the war and deal with the "rough-and-tumble affair" of the peace 
settlement.222 He wrote to Cecil, "[although Lloyd George] does not perhaps 
adequately gauge the depths of his own ignorance [in foreign affairs] \and ... has 
217B. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (London 1936), 2: 176. 
2181bid., 195. 
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certain peculiarities which ... make him, now and then difficult to work with," 
there was no one of equal ability to replace him. Therefore, Balfour continued, 
"the most patriotic course appears to me to be to provide [Lloyd George] ... with 
all the guidance and help in our power."223 As a result, the foreign secretary 
would not press issues to the point that they became politically charged and 
would bow to cabinet decisions. He believed in the need for a single command of 
the war effort even if this meant a period of dictatorship by Lloyd George: "Let 
If he thinks he can win the war, I'm all for his having a 
t "224 ry. 
**** 
Lloyd George may not have been a dictator, but he did dominate the 
direction of foreign policy. His overall goal as regards Russia was to end 
intervention and move towards rapprochement with the Soviet government 
which he considered the de facto government of Russia. These actions would be 
crucial both to a European peace settlement and the reconstruction of Britain. 
Intervention used a good part of the scarce funds available for financing social 
reforms and the transition to a peacetime economy. Continued operations in 
Russia also aggravated political divisions which threatened the coalition and 
thereby the base of support for his reconstruction plans. Furthermore, the 
inability to make Britain a "fit country for heroes to live in" and to bring the 
"heroes" home would only, in Lloyd George's opinion, radicalize the British 
people and raise the danger of civil unrest. Blocking a rapid end to intervention 
were the reactionary elements of the Conservative party. The prime minister 
223Jbid., 133; Warman, 150. 
224Dugdale, 121. 
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had to fmd a way to overcome their opposition without causing a break in the 
coalition's ranks. 
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Chapter3 
Towards A Solution: 
(November 1918 - January 1919) 
As has been shown, the political and financial problems caused by 
intervention prompted Lloyd George to adopt a policy which was anathema to 
the Tories. Subsequently, he was obliged to modify his policy as a result of 
domestic developments. This and the following chapter discuss what effects the 
general election of 1918, social unrest, the failure of the Prinkipo proposal, the 
search for a new solution to the problem of Russia, and the backbench revolt had 
on Lloyd George's Russian policy. 
**** 
Throughout November and most of December 1918, Lloyd George's main 
concern was winning the election. Pre-occuppied with campaigning and 
preparing for the peace conference, the prime minister had little time to devote 
to Russian policy. As Hankey recorded in his diary, "He is in a most excited and 
irritable condition owing to the General Election, and it is very difficult to get 
any serious work out of him."225 Lloyd George was also not going to make any 
major policy decisions until he better knew his political position. Initially, the 
prime minister's hesitation had been viewed as part of some devious plan 
involving the upcoming peace talks; but it was soon realized that it "was due to 
his wish to ascertain definitely exactly what endorsement his government had 
225Hank.ey diary, 22 November 1918. Roskill, 2: 21. Also see Hankey's entry for 17 December 1918 in Ibid., 35. 
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received at the hands of the people in the Parliament election."~26 Given, 
therefore, the many demands on Lloyd George's time and his uncertain political 
position, it was not surprising that he turned the matter of Russian policy over 
to his foreign secretary. 
Balfour was well aware of the threats to the government coming from 
Labour and the Tory Die-Hards. He first addressed the problem of how to win 
over public opinion and yet still keep the Conservative backbenchers faithful to 
the coalition on November 1. In his memorandum, "Notes on our Policy in 
Russia," Balfour recognized that the war's end would remove the basis for the 
existing policy.227 "For what then are we still maintaining troops in various 
parts of what was once the Russian Empire?" he asked. Balfour rightly saw 
that many viewed British efforts to fight the Germans in Russia as a campaign 
against Bolshevism. Such a view, he insisted, "indicates a complete 
misapprehension" of the government's intentions, especially given the current 
state of public opinion: 
This country would certainly refuse to see its forces, after more than four 
years of strenuous fighting, dissipated over the huge expanse of Russia in 
order to carry out political reforms in a State which is no longer a belligerent 
Ally.228 
The foreign secretary went on to make it quite clear that the government had no 
desire to intervene in Russian domestic affairs. The fact that Britain had acted 
with forces "favourable to the Entente" did not necessarily imply a desire to 
impose "a particular political system among the Russian people." However, this 
226Grayson diary (Woodrow Wilson's personal physician), 27 December 1918. A. Link, ed. The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, NJ 1986), 53: 519. Hereafter cited as Woodrow Wilson 
Papers. Also see Telegram 126, House to Wilson, 20 November 1918; Ibid., 142 and Telegram 173, 
House to Wilson, 25 November 1918; Ibid., 197. 
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did not mean that Britain was wholly uninterested either. 
Recent events have created obligations which last beyond the occasions 
which gave them birth .... [N]ew anti-Bolshevik administrations have grown up 
under the shelter of Allied forces. We are responsible for their existence and 
must endeavour to support them .... For us no alternative is open at present 
than to use such troops as we possess to the best advantage; [and] where we have no troops to supply arms and money .... 229 
In effect Balfour was stating that the military policy had created its own 
momentum which had to be addressed. However, public opinion had made one 
course impossible, namely the sending of more troops to crush Bolshevism. He 
admitted it was impossible to determine how the policy toward Russia would 
"ultimately develop" and proposed no solutions. This state of affairs, Balfour 
conceded, "must necessarily seem halting and imperfect ... but it is all that we 
can accomplish or ought in existing circumstances to attempt." The foreign 
secretary had basically stated that he had no policy and would play for time 
until the War Cabinet decided what to do or events in Russia provided a 
solution. 
This was the attitude Balfour brought to a Foreign Office meeting on 
November 13, the first occasion of the discussion of future Russian policy since 
the Armistice. Besides Foreign Office personnel, Lord Milner and other 
members of the War Office were present. Sir Henry Wilson ( Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff), unable to attend, submitted a memorandum which laid 
out his purely military views. 230 Wilson stated in this document that there 
were three possible courses of action. One was the creation of a "cordon 
sanitaire," whereby all troops would be withdrawn from Russia and a ring of 
states would be built up as a bulwark against Bolshevik expansion. However, 
229/bid., 695. 
230
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such a plan would give the initiative to the Soviet government while burdening 
the Allies with the indefinite support of the border states. An alternative was to 
"grasp the nettle firmly" and to launch a campaign in Russia to destroy 
Bolshevism. The C.I.G.S. did not recommend this course as the Allies did not 
have the troops to accomplish it. He concluded, "One course only remains, 
namely, to do all we can in the way of material to give our friends a fair start, 
and then to withdraw." After all, he said, as regards Britain's "friends" (the 
anti-Bolsheviks), "If the Bolsheviks are the better men, we cannot indefinitely 
continue to protect the others." Wilson concluded his memorandum by 
recommending that British troops be withdrawn from Russia by the time the 
peace treaty was signed. 
This document was read into the record by Cecil at the opening of the 
Foreign Office meeting.231 However, Balfour (in the Chair) was not prepared to 
adopt any specific lines of action. He immediately brushed aside any discussion 
of Wilson's views saying that it would be impossible for troops to be withdrawn 
by the conclusion of peace. Rather, he put forward two broad points for 
discussion with the first obviously drawn from his November 1 memorandum: 
1. The British Government cannot embark on an anti-Bolshevik crusade in 
Russia .... [For] the people of this country would not consent to such a cru.sade. 
2. It is necessary that support should be afforded to the border States of 
Western Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea.232 
These non-controversial points were followed by proposals to continue current 
operations in Russia. Not surprisingly, Milner and Cecil readily agreed with 
Balfour. After a short discussion in which Milner expressed his view that 
Bolshevism must be kept from the borders of the British Empire and Cecil said 
231
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Britain should support and strengthen existing White Russian organizations, 
ten decisions were adopted. They called simply for the continuation of current 
policy with slight variations in certain cases, but in no instance would new 
troops be sent. 
On the following day, these decisions were endorsed with little discussion 
by the War Cabinet. The cabinet also moved to have the Foreign Office collect 
and publish "as much material as possible in regard to the behaviour of the 
Bolsheviks. "233 The prime minister thought this important because Britain 
"had a great, inflammable, industrial population" and it should know how 
industrial workers had suffered under the Bolsheviks. Also, this counter-
propaganda would appeal to the Die-Hards and could be a useful weapon 
against Labour during the election campaign. Of greater importance was the 
adoption by the government of Balfour's policy proposals. They were so readily 
accepted by the War Cabinet because they lacked any real driving principle and 
thus were politically neutral. 234 Balfour was not calling for either war against 
Bolshevism or withdrawal from Russia; he simply said Britain should maintain 
current operations. Here was the policy's great virtue. If the Tory backbenchers 
complained that the government was being soft on Bolshevism, Bonar Law could 
tell them that the government was doing all it could under the conditions. If 
Labour attacked British intervention in Russia, the government could reply that 
it had no intention to impose a government upon the Russian people and that it 
was not sending any more troops there. With the issue of Russia thus 
neutralized, there would be no source of contention to split apart the Tory and 
Liberal elements of the coalition or to give Labour a chance to attack the 
233War Cabinet minutes, 14 November 1918. Ibid., 689-693. 
234Ullman, 2: 16-17. 
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government. 
The blunting of a Labourite attack was seen in the Commons on 
November 18. Arthur Ponsonby asked the government if troops were to be 
withdrawn. Cecil at f rrst sought to avoid answering the question by arguing 
that he could not give any statement without first consulting with those 
responsible for military operations in Russia. Joined by Colonel Wedgwood, 
Ponsonby pressed for an answer. Cecil finally replied that the government was 
aware of the unpopularity of continued operations in Russia and that it was 
"certainly not disposed to entangle this country at the close of a great war in 
serious military operations. "235 To discourage further discussion of the subject, 
Cecil then attacked Ponsonby for being pro-Bolshevik. This exchange presented 
Balfour's policy of no war -- no peace and the government's tactic of bludgeonjng 
Labour with the Bolshevik stick. 
The general election returned Lloyd George and his coalition, but it put 
the prime minister in a curious position. 236 The election was fought on Lloyd 
George's record and not along party lines. The electorate ardently supported the 
prime mjnister and gave his "couponed" supporters a complete victory. A 
preponderance of Coalition Conservatives was returned, 339 to be exact. 
Coalition Liberals won 134 seats while the independent Liberals were wiped 
out. Despite winning over 22 percent of the vote, Labour also suffered 
heavily.237 The majority of the party's 59 seats went to representatives of the 
Miners' Federation and other trade unions. Lloyd George and his colleagues 
were shocked at the election's outcome. Hankey commented that the prime 
235110 HC Deb, col. 3263. 
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minister "was almost stunned by his overwhelming victory and seemed really 
upset by Asquith's defeat .... Bonar Law admitted he was not elated, but greatly 
sobered. "238 In fact, Bonar Law reportedly said that the coalition had "too large 
a majority. "239 The Tory predominance was certainly too great to allow the 
deal-making which would ensure a consensus of opinion. Parliament was now 
shifted to the right, endangering the government's plans for reconstruction. 
What was worse from the prime minister's perspective was that there was 
now an independent majority of Conservatives, preventing the formation of a 
Liberal-Labour government. This meant that Lloyd George could not coerce the 
Tories to do his will by threatening to resign. As a result, he was, in a sense, 
subject to Tory will.240 The prime minister's position was presented in a Daily 
Mail editorial: 
Sir George Younger, Lord Downham (Mr. Hayes Fisher), and Mr. Bonar Law 
have manoeuvred our gallant little Welsh wizard into a position in which he is 
almost entirely dependent upon the votes of those whom he so vigorously 
denounced at Limehouse a few years ago. 
He is now at the mercy of his recent enemies. Will they cajole the Prime 
Minister, or will he cajole them?241 
The real problem facing Lloyd George was the mass of Tory squires sitting 
on the backbenches. The New Statesman said that because of these men, "We 
may therefore assume that if any social ref orn1s come to pass the landlords will 
be the first to benefit by them."242 With regard to foreign policy, Brigadier 
Page-Croft, Horatio Bottomley, Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Guinness, and their 
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like set the tone, calling for a quick peace with full indemnities and no truck 
with pacifism or Bolshevism. 243 Viewing the House of Commons, one White 
Russian agent commented that "adherents of Russian Bolshevism are absent, 
and it [Parliament] has a quite significant contingent of friends of Russia."244 
**** 
Lloyd George's problems were compounded by growing industrial unrest. 
On November 16, it was reported in The New Statesman that the fmancial 
markets were uneasy over impending labor difficulties with many investors 
buying shares in enterprises in Brazil and Mexico. 245 In a letter to Lloyd 
George, Churchill (still at the Ministry of Munitions) stated that he was also 
anxious about demobilization and reconstruction: 
Although I am going very slow, and gaining time in every direction possible, 
I cannot help unloading from now onwards a continuous broadening stream of 
men and women workers. Others go on to short time, & all lose their high 
wartime wages & fall to a mere pittance & consequent discontent.246 
The long impending storm broke loose on November 20 when the National 
Union of Railwaymen withdrew from the wartime truce entered into with the 
railway companies and the government.247 The ensuing flood immediately 
followed: 2,000 boilermakers and almost 10,000 steelworkers were on strike by 
November 21.248 Workers at the Royal Arsenal in Woolwich met a short time 
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later to protest wholesale discharges by the government. 249 By the end of 
November the situation appeared to many rather bleak: "Already there are, in 
one town after another, crowds of discharged women munition workers 
besieging the EmploYlilent Exchanges, which are overwhelmed by the storm. "250 
At least one insurance company began issuing policies against "material 
damage caused by rioters, strikers, lock-outs of workmen and-or persons talcing 
part in labour disturbances or civil commotion. "251 Throughout December and 
January coal miners struck by the thousands while munition workers marched 
on Whitehall, and there were recurring rumors of a general strike by the Triple 
Alliance of miners, railwaymen, and transport workers. All demanded higher 
wages to fight the post-war inflation, shorter work-weeks, and job security. The 
government was widely attacked for having failed to plan properly the 
coordination of discharges with the creation of new employment. 252 Late in 
January came the great strikes in Belfast and Glasgow and War Cabinet 
meetings considering the use of troops to keep order. 253 
The soldiers themselves were also very restive. The men were impatient 
to return to their homes and not to miss out on the race for positions in the 
civilian economy.254 Their discontent grew as they believed that the slowness of 
demobilization was caused by the incompetence of officials or by their officers' 
desire to hold open the most lucrative jobs back home for themselves. The Daily 
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Mail reported of "an increasing number of letters dealing with demobilization 
waste, blunders, and neglect."255 Often men home from distant theaters of war 
were sent back on long voyages to await their release from the colors. Also 
causing great dissension was the demobilization plans themselves. In many 
cases, the "key men" and "slip men" who were sent back to Britain first had been 
the last to be recruited. The "key men," considered vital to the war industries, 
were naturally kept out of uniform until the desperate need for men forced the 
government to send them, threatening arn1s production. The "slip men," those 
who had notes from their employers, were often only able to obtain these letters 
because, having only recently left the factories, their employers still 
remembered them. Such a state of affairs did not sit at all well with the soldiers 
who had spent years in the trenches. Why should they continue to suffer while 
those who had done the least fighting were sent back to get all the jobs? 
Churchill later described the situation: 
The fighting man has a grim sense of justice, which it is dangerous to affront. 
As the result the discipline of every single separate unit throughout the whole 
of our Army in all the theatres of war was swiftly and simultaneously rotted 
and undermined.256 
On Friday, January 3, the troops began to make their discontent known. That 
day at Folkestone some 10,000 men who were scheduled to return to France left 
the rest camps and marched through the town, assembling at the town hall to 
complain about the delays in demobilization. The next day they repeated their 
actions. Only this time some declared themselves as representatives of the 
Soldiers' Union.257 At Dover similar demonstrations took place. Some 2,000 
men refused to embark for France on the grounds that many of them had work 
255Daily Mail, 4 January 1919. 
256Churchill, 42. 
257The Times, 6 January 1919. 
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to go to and that their demobilization papers were practically completed.258 
These demonstrations quickly spread to other camps in Britain. Soon soldiers 
were loading themselves into trucks and driving to Whitehall to visit the 
Demobilization Department.259 These demonstrations were, for the most part, 
peaceful. Only in Luton was there "actual and serious rioting" where the town 
hall was burnt by the mob.260 Ominous reports about the temper of the troops 
were also coming from France. Discontent flared up in Calais at the end of 
January when a mutiny broke out among the transportation units. Joined by 
troops just returned from Britain, the mutineers demanded to be sent back 
home. After four days, the camp was surrounded by machine guns while a 
brigade with fixed bayonets marched in and arrested the ring leaders. 261 After 
this major incident, unrest in the army declined. On February 8 a large group 
of soldiers marched through Horse Guards Parade after waiting all night for 
trains to return them to France. The incident ended peacefully when they were 
given breakast and assured that trains were waiting at Victoria Station. 262 The 
last case of troop unrest occurred a month later at the Canadian camp at 
Kinmel Park. 263 
258/bid. 
259The Times, 7 and 8 January 1919. 
260Churchill, 50. 
261This incident does not appear to have been reported by the British press. See Churchill, 50 
and Sir Douglas Haig to Churchill, 31 January 1919. Churchill Papers, 501. 
262The Times, 10 February 1919; Churchill, 51. 
268The Times, B March 1919. · 
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Confronted with the increasing 11nrest of both workers and soldiers and a 
large contingent of Tory backbenchers, Lloyd George faced a predicament. How 
could he get Britain out of Russia (thus facilitating demobilization and 
reconstruction) without bringing the wrath of the Conservatives down upon the 
government? A unilateral withdrawal by Britain from Russia was certainly not 
a feasible alternative, but a multilateral action taken by all the Allies at the 
Paris peace conference might be a solution. The prime minister could deny full 
blame for the abandonment of the Whites by saying he had acted in concert with 
the other countries in the interest of world peace. However, Lloyd George saw a 
better way to make use of the peace conference. If he could bring the Soviets 
and Whites together in Paris and forge an all-Russian government which the 
Allies could recognize, Lloyd George would be able to get Britain out of Russia 
with a minimum of opposition from the Tories and Labour. Given the prime 
minister's interpersonal style and love of summit diplomacy, it was not 
surprising that he pursued the idea of a negotiated settlement. 
The first step toward such a solution was to get the various Russian 
factions represented at the peace conference. Lloyd George's initial attempt to 
achieve this occurred at the Inter-Allied meetings held in London in early 
December 1918 to coordinate Allied actions at the up-coming peace conference. 
However, when the subject of Russian representation was raised at the 
December 3 meeting Georges Clemenceau, the French premier, argued that 
Russian views should not be heard for Russia had betrayed the Allies. Lloyd 
George countered by saying that Russia must be represented: "The affairs of 
nearly two hundred million people could not be settled without hearing 
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them. "264 This also meant that the Soviet government had to be invited. 
Despite what might be thought of them, Lloyd George argued, the Bolsheviks 
"appeared to have a hold over the majority of the population." This fact, he 
continued, "could not be neglected because ... [it was] unpalatable."265 Meeting 
continued resistance fro1:11 Clemenceau, Lloyd George softened his statement by 
asking only that the Allies keep an open mind on the subject for the time being. 
The delegates then decided to put off the matter until the peace conference. 
Although nothing was accomplished Lloyd George was now aware "that the 
Russian Bolsheviks had excited animosities and apprehensions in Western 
Europe which would make it impracticable to bring them into conference on 
equal terms with the Allies. "266 He also realized that the French would be as 
great an obstacle to his plans at the peace conference as the Tories were in 
Britain. 
In the remaining few weeks before the meetings in Paris, Lloyd George 
continued his efforts in meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet (later renamed 
the British Empire Delegation at the peace conference). At the I.W.C. meeting 
on December 23, the prime minister presented the idea of dealing directly with 
the Soviets and was, for the first time, confronted with the anti-Bolshevik 
position of Winston Churchill. Still Minister of Munitions, Churchill began the 
discussion by asking that the cabinet reach a definite decision on Russian policy 
because the government's policy of limited intervention was unsatisfactory. The 
government had either to allow the Russians "to murder each other without let 
or hindrance" or to intervene "with large forces, abundantly supplied with 
264Inter-Allied Conference minutes, 3 December 1918. Peace Conference, 1: 211. 
2651bid. 
266Jbid., 1: 212-13. 
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mechanical appliances" to destroy Bolshevism.267 The latter was Churchill's 
pe~sonal preference. Lloyd George silenced Churchill by arguing that the troops 
for such an undertaking could not be found without conscription, and this would 
"certainly cause trouble at home. "268 Also, in response to the call of protecting 
the White Russian forces, he pointed out that they were a minority in Russia 
and that the government should not be obligated to protect this faction from the 
majority simply because Britain had aided it during the war. In other words, 
moral obligations did not justify continued intervention. Finally, turning to the 
propaganda war directed against Britain, Lloyd George commented that the 
government could not complain as British forces in Russia "not infrequently 
shot Bolsheviks" in the course of military operations.269 Instead, he asked that 
R.H. Clive, the Charge d'Affairs in Stockholm, should be allowed to receive from 
Maxim Litvinov, the Deputy Commisar for Foreign Affairs, the Sovie~' 
proposals for peace. Lloyd George's motion met with quiet approval with 
Balfour only urging that Clive be told to act discretely so as not to alarm the 
Allies, especially the French. This I.W.C. meeting marked the first time 
opposition to his plans for a settlement involving the Bolsheviks came from 
inside the government. That evening Lloyd George was reported to be in a 
"most irritable frame of mind. "270 
The Imperial War Cabinet next met on December 30. Though no peace 
proposals had yet been received from the Bolsheviks, the meeting yielded a new 
approach to the Russian problem. Addressing the cabinet, Robert Borden (the 
2671.W.C. minutes, 23 December 1918. lnlman, 2: 90. 
268Ibid., 91. 
269 Jbid., 92. 
270Hankey Diary, 23 December 1918. Roskill, 2: 38. 
70 
', 
' 
J~ 
,, 
t 
·, 
-,H 
., 
·---,-·,· ·'''·:' -.• .- ,._ .•. ,, "'.: --. ,.,, ••. '., _,, ..•. J·•··,' , .•. , .. 
Canadian premier) said he saw only two possible solutions. One was increased 
intervention and the other, which he preferred, "was to induce the Governments 
of the various States in Russia to send representatives to Paris for a conference 
with the Allied and associate nations. "271 The Allies could then pressure the 
groups into a comprehensive settlement of the Civil War, creating one Russian 
government which could be recognized. While having his reservations about 
dealing with the Bolsheviks, Cecil supported Borden's idea. He only added that 
a cease-fire should be a condition for those coming to Paris. Lord Milner then 
thre~ in his support with Cecil's. 272 Lloyd George, probably somewhat 
surprised at Cecil's/ and Milner's readiness to talk with the Bolsheviks, agreed 
with Borden's plan; but he made it clear that a cease-fire would have to work 
both ways. Both General Denikin and the Siberian government would have to 
stand fast if the Bolsheviks did.273 It should be noted that this consensus was 
reached in the absence of Churchill. Little more was said on the suggestion, but 
Lloyd George found it highly acceptable. Basically, it was the same as his own 
idea to get the Russians together in Paris, resulting in a settlement between the 
Soviets and the Whites. 
The next day the I.W.C. met for the last time before the peace conference. 
Armed with Borden's rather popular idea and fearing that Churchill was 
gradually drawing Britain ever deeper into Russia, Lloyd George sought to win 
adoption of this new path to settlement. At the meeting, Churchill once again 
called for a definite decision on British policy and promoted his scheme to crush 
Bolshevism through military intervention. Lloyd George agreed that a 
2711.W.C. minutes, 30 December 1918. Peace Conference, 1: 123. Also see Borden, 890. 
272Peace Conference, 1: 123. 
278Jbid., 124. 
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continued lack of policy might easily lead to disaster. He therefore asked for 
support for the policy he was to put before the peace conference. The prime 
minister then declared that he "was definitely opposed to military intervention 
in any shape. "274 He put forth a number of arguments to support his position. 
First of all, Lloyd George asked where Britain would find the necessary troops 
for operations in Russia. "We already had to find troops for Germany, Palestine, 
Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus. "275 It was unlikely that the dominions would 
contribute anything. British troops could only be obtained through conscription 
which would create no end of trouble at home. Lloyd George said that he 
doubted whether the troops would go at all: "Our citizen army were prepared to 
go anywhere for liberty, but they could not be convinced that the suppression of 
Bolshevism was a war for liberty."276 Furthermore, the presence of British 
troops in Russia would only strenghthen the Bolsheviks by allowing them to 
appeal to the patriotism of the Russian people. The best solution was to let 
Bolshevism fail of itself. He concluded his statement by asking the cabinet to 
support his view on intervention and his plan to invite "the representatives of 
all sections of Russia to appear before the Peace Conference, as Sir Robert 
Borden had suggested, with a view to their composing their differences. "277 
Cecil then mentioned the moral obligation of Britain to the vVhites but received 
no support. The cabinet discussion ended with the endorsement of Lloyd 
George's policy outline. Lloyd George had won a major victory. Churchill had 
been overcome and the path seemed clear to a Russian settlement. Only the 
2741.W.C. minutes, 31 December 1918. Ibid., 214. 
275Ibid., 215. 
276Jbid. 
277Ibid., 216. 
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French had to be convinced. 
On 2 January 1919 the Foreign Office sent a message to its 
representatives in Paris, Rome, Washington, and Tokyo. It asked them to 
"suggest to Government to which you are accredited the propriety of 
transmitting following message" to Moscow, the White Russian governments at 
Omsk, Ekaterinburg, and Archangel, and the "Governments of ex-Russian 
states." The message stated the following: 
If the aforesaid Governments and parties will immediately suspend 
hostilities on all fronts for the duration of the peace negotiations, and if they or 
any of them should desire to send representatives to Paris to discuss with the 
Great Powers conditions of a perm.anent settlement, the Great Powers would 
be prepared to enter on such a discussion with them.278 
The British representatives were to assure the Allied governments that this 
.. ' "\ 
proposal was only for private discussion and not a definite policy position. 
Stephan Pichon, the French foreign minister, replied to the note on January 7 
and "categorically refused on behalf of the French Government to have anything 
to do with the Bolsheviks."279 The proposal was equated with recognition of the 
Soviet government. "The criminal regi,me of the Bolshevists, who in no way 
represent democratic government, or even any possibility of 
government, ... cannot claim to be recognized as a regular Government. "280 
Dealing with the Soviet would only dishonor the Allies while giving a boon to 
Bolshevik propaganda. "The French Government, for its part, refuses to enter 
into a compact with crime."281 
278Memorandum 10, Barclay (British Charg{ at Washington) to Polk (Acting Secretary of State), 3 January 
1919. FRUS, 1919, Russia (Washington, DC 1937), 2-3. 
279Derby diary, 11 January 1919. Woodrow Wilson Papers, 53: 722. 
280Pichon's note was later printed in L'Humanite but with an incorrect date. This article was 
translated and printed in The Times, 13 January 1919. 
281Jbid. 
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Lloyd George was brought face-to-face with this strident French 
opposition on 12 January at the formal opening of the peace conference. In a 
meeting of the Council of Ten, Stephan Pichon declared that Russia should have 
no representation at the conference. He pointed out that there were "various 
representatives of Russian opinion" already in Paris "who represented every 
shade of opinion" and that these people could present their views unofficially to 
the Allies.282 Lloyd George responded with the remark that these men 
"represented every opinion except the prevalent opinion in Russia."283 The 
Bolsheviks, he said, were the de facto rulers of Russia. "We had formally 
recognized the Czar's Governm.ent ... [though] we knew it to be absolutely rotten," 
Lloyd George explained, "because it was the de facto Government" so why not 
the Soviet government?284 Furthermore, he stated, "to say that we ourselves 
should pick the representatives of a great people was contrary to every principle 
for which we had fought. "285 Pichon then said that he had only wished to take 
advantage of the anti-Bolsheviks' presence to hear their views. Lloyd George 
objected that to do so would give the public the impression that the Allies 
thought the Whites represented Russia. He then recommended a compromise 
solution which Pichon accepted: Russia would not be represented but the anti-
Bolsheviks could be interviewed personally or asked to supply memoranda. 
Lloyd George had been able to stop the anti-Bolsheviks from being heard 
unofficially, robbing them of the recognition they would have gained. He had 
also put forward his case to the Allies that the Soviet regime was the de facto 
282Council of Ten minutes, 12 Janu~ry 1919. FRUS, Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (Washington, DC 1943), 3: 490. Hereafter cited as FRUS, PPC. 
2831bid., 491. 
284[bid. 
285Ibid. 
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government of Russia, and therefore they must be heard. 
The next day Lloyd George addressed a meeting of the British Empire 
Delegation and informed them of the French refusal to accept the I.W.C.'s 
proposal for bringing Russian representatives to Paris: "The French had 
adopted a very strong line; they wished to fight Bolshevism. "286 William 
Hughes, the Australian premier, then commented that "Bolshevism as an 
internal Russian question did not concern us; Bolshevism as a power preparing 
to assault its neighbors did."287 In opposition to Balfour's views, Lloyd George 
argued that it was very possible that "what we took for invasion in Poland, 
Finland, &c., was really a spontaneous Bolshevik movement on the part of the 
local population."288 Therefore, Britain was not dealing with Bolshevik 
aggression but the internal politics of anoth~r country. In such a case there was 
no reason to add to Britain's commitment by sending material and financial 
support to the country. To the prime minister, all the current talk of the 
Bolshevik threat was nonsense: given the current size of the Red Army, "it was 
hardly credible that the Bolsheviks could withstand the pressure upon them 
from the east and from the north, and at the same time invade Finland, 
Esthonia, Poland, the Caucasus, and Persia, without mentioning the march on 
the Rhine and the conquest of India."289 The danger just was not present to 
warrant the expense of continued intervention. Such action would only stir up 
Bolshevik propaganda. He ended his argument by proposing the following 
286BED meeting in Paris, 13 January 1919. K. Bourne and D.C. Watt, general eds., British 
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, 
Part 2, Series 1. M. Dockrill, ed. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (London 1989), 3: 324. 
Hereafter cited as BDFA, PPC. 
287Jbid. 
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policy: 
(a.) Non-interference with the internal affairs of the Bolshevik area; 
(b.) Assistance to the countries under Allied protection against invasion by 
troops from without, but no interference as between two political parties 
within such countries; 
(c.) As to the Ukraine, Don, and Serbia, any assistance, financial or material, 
that might be possible, excluding troops.290 
Without opposition, these policy points were accepted by the delegation. 
The prime minister continued his efforts to have his proposals adopted by 
the Council of Ten on January 16. He began the discussion of Russian affairs by 
saying that the French had misunderstood the British proposal of January 2. 
The British government had never "suggested that the Bolshevik Government 
should be recognized to the extent of offering them a seat at the Peace 
Conference."291 It had merely proposed that the various warring factions in 
Russia be asked to cease hostilities and send representatives to Paris where the 
Allies would help them settle their differences. The only alternatives to this 
plan, Lloyd George continued, were the Allied destruction of Bolshevism or the 
cordon sanitaire. The first alternative could not be seriously considered, for 
none of the Allies was "prepared to send a million men into Russia;" he was 
doubtful whether even "a thousand would be willing to go."292 He then referred 
to reports of troops in Siberia and Northern Russia clamoring to go home. 
Britain, he said, would not undertake the task. On the other hand, the policy of 
blockading Russia would lead to mass starvation. The ordinary population, not 
the Bolsheviks, would die, Lloyd George argued; for there was no one inside 
Russia to overthrow the Soviet government. This policy the ref ore must be 
rejected on humanitarian grounds. The only other plan was the proposal for a 
290lbid. 
291Council of Ten minutes, 16 January 1919. FRUS, PPC, 3: 581. 
292Jbid., 582. 
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meeting at Paris of all the Russian representatives. "We could not leave Paris 
at the conclusion of the Peace Conference congratulating ourselves on having 
made a better world, if at that moment half of Europe and half of Asia were in 
flames."293 The prime minister concluded his statements by addressing the 
French fear that the presence of Bolshevik emissaries in Paris would lead to the 
spread of Bolshevism in France and Britain. 
If England becomes Bolshevist, it will not be because a single Bolshevist 
representative is permitted to enter England. On the other hand, if a military 
!enterprise were started against the Bolsheviks, that would make England 
Bolshevist, and there would be a Soviet in London. 294 
The Soviet delegates, he said, could easily be kept in check by imposing 
conditions upon them. Failure to observe them would result in the Bolsheviks 
being sent back to Russia. Lloyd George found considerable support from 
President Wilson who said that, in his mind, "there was no possible answer to 
the view expressed by Mr. Lloyd George" and that it "corresponded exactly with 
the information received from Russia by the United States Government."295 
The French foreign minister then moved that the meeting adjourn discussion of 
Russian affairs until 21 January so that agents just returned from Russia could 
present, in Pichon's words, "very interesting information 
Bolshevism."296 Once again, Lloyd George had been blocked by the French. 
The measure of the prime minister's frustration was seen on Sunday, 
January 19. At a private dinner in his apartment, Lloyd George stated that the 
French were unmovable in their refusal to allow the Bolsheviks to come to 
2931bid., 583. 
294From the U.S. roinut.es of the January 16 meeting. Ibid., 591. 
295Jbid., 583. 
296The French brought Joseph Noulens before the Council of Ten the following Monday. He · 
g~ve an account of Bolshevik atrocities based wholly on hearsay. Peace Conference, 1: 222. 
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Paris. Clemenceau had even said he would resign if the prime minister and 
President Wilson forced the idea on him. Bonar Law then told the prime 
minister that, if he was to press his policy to the extent of clashing with 
Clemenceau, the coalition government would be broken, for the Conservatives 
c~ felt strongly about Bolshevism. Lloyd George then replied, "If that is the case 
the government had better be broken." Complaining of Clemenceau's 
intransigence, he remarked that "the old man must be taken by the scruff of the 
neck."297 
The following evening, at a meeting of the British Empire Delegation, the 
still fuming prime minister won complete and unanimous support for his 
policies. Reporting a conversation with French general Franchet d'Esperey, 
Lloyd George said that the French wanted to wage war on the Bolsheviks with 
Allied money and volunteers. Balfour then commented that America would 
certainly not participate. Borden added that Canada would not send an army. 
In any case, Lloyd George said, Clemenceau would not allow Bolsheviks to come 
to Paris. "The other proposal was that a Commission should go to Russia to 
confer with representatives of all parties."298 During the discussion, Hughes 
stressed the need of containing the Bolshevik regime even to the extent of 
supporting the de facto government of the Ukraine if the Red Army invaded that 
territory. Lloyd George asked him where he would get the troops for such a 
policy: "Sir Robert Borden had said that he would not keep Canadian troops 
there [in Russia]. Would Mr. Hughes send Australian troops?" Hughes said he 
would not. Furthermore, Lloyd George asked the Dominion leaders, "Were we 
297Events of the dinner were reported by Sir William Wiseman, the British liaison officer with 
the American delegation. lnlman, 2: 105-6. 
298BED minutes, 20 January 1919. BDFA, PPC, 3: 327. 
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w to keep troops in Russia, or to subsidise troops there, and would the Dominions 
. . ?" JOm. Borden said that public opinion in Canada would not support such 
actions. Lloyd George said he thought the same was the case in Britain. If 
troops wer·e not sent, then should arms and money still be sent? It was 
generally agreed that the cost would be too great and that such action was 
incompatible with the principle of non-intervention. Balfour pointed out that 
the past support of White governments had been conducted during the war to 
keep Germany occupied in the East. "If we withdrew we should not be deceiving 
them, but it was a difficult policy to make attractive. "299 Lloyd George 
supported this view that there was no longer an obligation. 
We had gone there to fight the Germans, not the Bolshevists. If we were 
going to continue we must do it to the extent of many millions. Ten millions 
would mean 3d. on the Income Tax, and would not go far. It might easily come 
to ls.300 . 
Such an increase would be unacceptable to the_ ;British people already burdened 
by the National Debt. He suggested that the proposal be put to the French in 
this way: "That unless some effort was made to bring the parties together, we 
must make it clear that we must immediately cease intervention or subsidies to 
troops."301 Lloyd George however added that withdrawal could be temporarily 
withheld if the French "agreed to meet the Bolshevists anywhere -- say at 
Salonica or Lemnos." Also, he said, any independent state created out of former 
Russian territory should be protected from invasion according to the wishes of 
the Allies.302 The delegation then agreed to formally adopt the prime minister's 
policy views. 
299Jbid., 330. 
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Lloyd George still had to win over the French to his suggestion for a 
conference. At the Council of Ten meeting of 21 January, he fmally succeeded 
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with the support of Woodrow Wilson. After discussions in the morning in which 
the council heard the fervent anti-Bolshevik views of the former Danish 
Minister in Russia and Wilson read in length from a report of conversations 
with Litvinov, the Council reconvened in the afternoon to decide what should be 
done about Russia. President Wilson began the meeting by saying he wanted to 
take advantage of a suggestion made by Lloyd George and to propose a 
modification of the British plan for an all-Russian meeting. The conference, he 
suggested, could be held in Salonica instead of Paris. 303 The prime minister 
then pointed out for the benefit of the French that "the advantage of this would 
be that they [the Bolsheviks] could be brought straight there from Russia 
through the Black Sea without passing through other countries. "304 
Surprisingly, the greatest oppositiop to the plan came from Italy. Baron 
Sonnino, the Italian foreign minister, argued that all Russian groups had 
representatives in Paris except the Bolsheviks, ·who he did not want to hear. 
Lloyd George then remarked, "the Bolsheviks were the very people some of them 
wished to hear."305 Furthermore, said President Wilson, a meeting of all 
303The fact that Wilson -- and not Lloyd George -- proposed a change in location for the meeting 
has long puzzled (or been avoided) by historians. Lloyd George commented in his memoirs that 
just before adjournment of the 10:30 AM meeting of the Council of Ten, Clemenceau approached 
Wilson and himself and told them that it was impossible for Bolsheviks to come to Paris as it 
would raise a storm in the Chamber of Deputies. Clemenceau suggested that if a meeting had to 
take place, it should be held in the eastern Mediterranean. (Peace Conference, 1: 232.) Evidently, 
Lloyd George then told President Wilson about his plan to move the meeting to Salonica or 
Lemnos for Lloyd George was later reported as telling Churchill that "Wilson rushed in and took 
it all on himself' at the 3:00 PM meeting. (Mary Spears diary for 24 January 1919. Churchill 
Paper~,. 47~.) RhiddBel! ~ehemed to bbelievhe that Lloyd George had "stage-managbed" the scene to avoid (' 
opposition m t e nt1s press, ut t e prime minister disclaimed responsi ility. (Riddell Diary 
(22 January 1919), 13.) 
304Council of Ten minutes, 21 January 1919. FRUS, PPC, 3: 647. 
305Jbid., 648. 
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Russian representatives "would bring about a marked reaction against 
. 
Bolshevism" inside Russia.306 Finally, Clemenceau spoke up. He did not favor 
the meeting "not because they were criminals, but because we would be raising 
them to our level by saying that they were· worthy of entering into conversation" 
with the Allies. However, Clemenceau continued, "the Allies were in need of a 
speedy solution," and he did not want to create "the appearance of disagreement 
I 
amongst them. "307 He therefore would accept the plan if Wilson drafted the 
proposal. Lloyd George immediately endorsed Clemenceau's motion. Sonnino 
demurred by advocating the continued military support of the anti-Bolsheviks. 
Lloyd George, repeating the argument he had used at the previous British 
Empire Delegation meeting, then asked who would supply the troops and money 
for th.is policy. Wilson and Clemenceau replied that their countries would make 
no contributions. The Italian premier, Vittorio Orlando,,then stepped in, stating 
that Italy would not give further support. Overruled, Sonnino remained silent 
for the rest of the meeting. The Council concluded its discussions of Russian 
affairs by agreeing that President Wilson should draft the proclamation inviting 
the Russians to attend the meeting with the condition that all hostilities cease 
during the meeting of the conference. 
The next day Wilson's draft message was presented and accepted by the 
Council of Ten. The note begar1 by presenting the proposal to meet at Prinkipo 
as an act of goodwill by an impartial and detached peace conference: 
The single object the representatives of the Associated Powers have in mind 
in their discussions of the course they should pursue with regard to Russia has 
been to help the Russian people, not to hinder them, or to interfere in any 
manner with their right to settle their own affairs in their own way. 308 
306Ibid., 649. 
307Jbid. 
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The Allies sought only "the peace of Europe and the world" whi.ch could not be 
attained if Russia were not at peace. For this purpose, the Allies put forth the 
following proposal, 
[We] invite every organised group that is now existing, or attempting to 
exercise, political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within 
the boundaries of European Russia ... to send representatives ... to the Princes 
Islands, Sea of Marmora ... provided, in the meantime, there is a truce of arms 
amongst the parties invited.309 
The Russian delegates were assured that they could confer with the Allies' 
representatives in the "freest and frankest way" in order to reach an agreement 
"by which Russia may work out her own purposes" and establish cooperative 
relations with the rest of the world.310 In conclusion, the Russian 
representatives would be expected at the appointed place by February 15. 
**** 
The Prinkipo proposal was the result of weeks of work and negotation on 
the part of Lloyd George. As he saw the situation, the only way to end 
intervention was to reach an overall settlement of the Russian Civil War. 
Simply pulling out of Russia and abandoning the White counter-revolutionaries 
had become political suicide following the Tory landslide victory at the general 
election. Any solution of the Russian problem had to involve the Whites if Lloyd 
George was to keep the coalition intact. The prime minister was also under 
pressure to reach a settlement quickly because of the unrest in the factories and 
the army. However, his plans for gathering the Russians in Paris met with 
determined French opposition. In the end a compromise was worked out. The 
t,,. 
Prinkipo proposal's eventual failure led Lloyd George to reconsider his plan to 
809Ibid., 677. 
310[bid. 
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Chapter4 
Failure and Compromise: 
(February 1919 - April 1919) 
After a promising start, the Prinkipo proposal failed to come to fruition. 
The Soviet government quickly accepted the plan, saying it was "prepared to 
open negotiations immediately on the Island of Prinkipo or elsewhere, either 
with all the Entente powers or with any of them separately, or with any political 
groups in Russia, in accordance with the request of the Entente PowersJ'311 
However, the Whites were not so anxious to conclude peace. Although they 
appreciated the high motives of the Allies, the unified governments of Siberia, 
Archangel, and Southern Russia refused to meet with the Bolsheviks. The 
Whites considered the Bolsheviks "traitors" who had "fomented anarchy and 
trodden underfoot the democratic principles which guide civilized states, and 
they maintain themselves in power only by terrorism."312 Even though they 
were wholly dependent upon Allied support for their continued existence, the 
"iJ 
anti-Bolsheviks had refused to comply with the Allies' wishes. The Whites were 
able to do so because of Allied disunity. 313 The Prinkipo proposal, though a 
compromise, H.ad been forced on the French who promptly proceeded to thwart 
its possible success. The White Russian governments were assured by the 
French government of continued support if they did not accept the Allied 
311Unnumbered telegram, Chicherin (Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs) to the Principal 
Allied and Associated Governments, 4 February 1919. FRUS, 1919, Russia, 41-42. 
312Russian Embassy in France to the Secretariat-General of the Paris Peace Conference, 12 
February 1919. Ibid., 54. 
313Thompson argues that the Prinkipo proposal died because neither Lloyd George nor Wilson 
made any eff?rt to counteract Allied disunity. Thompson, 119-30. 
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plan.314 The British War Office was also pledging its support for the counter-
revolutionaries. On February 5 a Russian agent in London wired Omsk, 
Churchill told me in a confidential meeting that the War Ministry will 
continue to provide the Russian military forces struggling against Bolshevism 
with all necessary supplies. 'I will continue this supplying unless I receive 
categorical instructions to cease.'315 
Churchill had been tied to the War Office in London during the weeks that 
Lloyd George had been working for a meeting with the Russians and was quite 
angry when he learned of the Prinkipo plan. He told the prime minister one 
"one might as well legalize sodomy as recognize the 
Bolsheviks. "316 
Unaware of Churchill's actions at the War Office, Lloyd George fought for 
the Prinkipo plan in the newly opened House of Commons. During the debate 
on the King's address, Labour attacked Prinkipo as being inadequate while the 
Tories said it was tantamount to recognizing the Bolsheviks. On February 12, 
Colonel Guinness led the backbench attack. 
Negotiations with such a Government are entirely out of place, ... we ought 
not to acknowledge the Bolsheviks, we ought to remain in a state of war with 
them until we can dictate our terms to them in the same way as we are going 
to dictate our terms to Germany.317 
Lloyd George responded by saying that there was never any intention of 
recognizing the Soviet government. He stressed that the goal of the peace 
conference was peace in Russia. Intervention was not the solution: "If I gave the 
figure of what intervention meant, there is no sane man in Britain who would 
314The Bullitt Mission to Russia: Testimony of William C. Bullitt Before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate (New York 1919), 32. Herafter cited as Bullitt Mission. 
315Thompson, 122. ) 
316Mary Spears diary, 24 Jan~ry 1919. Chuchill Papers, 4 79. 
317112 HC Deb, cols. 184-85. Also see the comments of Brigadier-General Croft in Ibid., 113: col. 536, 5 
March 1919. 
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advise us, after nearly five years of war to undertake the enterprise."318 Lloyd 
George also attacked proposals for the continued support of the White 
governments. He asked if support meant money, munitions, or men? "America 
will send neither men, money, nor material, and therefore it practically falls 
upon France and ourselves. Has anyone calculated the cost?"319 
Large military budgets were an important concern to Lloyd George for 
they threatened reconstruct1on and thus the ability to calm the continuing labor 
}' 
/, ,, 
,1 
unrest. Since late January a violent strike in Glasgow for the forty-hour week 
{ 
J 
had been underway. MJny blamed the violence on Bolsheviks who were 
believed to be leading the strikers. 320 The London tube motormen also went on 
strike early in the month. This action was described by The Times as "a clear 
illustration of the anti-social nature of most of the strikes which are now in 
progress or in contemplation. "321 The most serious news came from the Miners' 
Federation. At its Southport convention on February 13, the union called for a 
vote on whether to strike on March 15.322 The multitude of previous wildcat 
strikes were already damaging the economic transition and reconstruction as 
coal prices steadily rose. 
[The strike] will come now when the nation is burdened and crippled with 
the gigantic cost of this great war, when its industries are practically at a 
standstill, when not merely a strike but the prospect of a strike is stopping 
business and arresting the free start of industry, when unemployment is on 
the increase. 323 
318112 HC Deb, col. 194, 12 February 1919. 
319Ibid., col. 196, 12 February 1919 . 
• 
320The Times, 1 February 1919. 
321/bid., 4 February 1919. 
322Ibid., 14 February 1919. 
323Minutes of the February 20 discussion between Lloyd George and the Miners' Federation at 10 Downing 
Street. Ibid., 22 February 1919. 
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Lloyd George thou,ght the situation so serious that he called the proposed strike 
a conflict with the state itself: "The State could not surrender if it began, 
without abdicating its functions." 324 However, the prime minister believed that 
the miners' demands should be discussed but further inquiry was needed. He 
proposed a royal commission which would investigate the claims for higher 
wages, shorter hours, and nationalization. The miners agreed to this plan, 
postponing the strike until March 22. This was a major victory for Lloyd George 
but any solution to the miners' problems would be expensive. 
At a February 12 meeting of the War Cabinet (three days before the 
Prinkipo proposal was to lapse), the prime minister continued to stress the 
lL 
economics ·of Russian poli~y .. At the meeting, Churchill was again pressing for a 
definite decision on what to do about Russia. He believed that Britain should 
intervene. After Lloyd George pointed out that such a policy would take a 
million men, Churchill replied that he did not suggest intervention on such a 
scale ''but we ought to try and keep alive the Russian forces. "325 Lloyd George 
avoided an answer, saying he was concerned about the costs involved. What he 
wanted, the prime minister continued, was a report from the War Office on the 
costs of the various alternatives before the government. The rest of the War 
Cabinet, especially Chamberlain, concurred. It ordered the C.I.G.S. to prepare a 
report on the costs of intervention, evacuation, supplying arms and money -- but 
not men -- to the White governments, and def ending the Russian border states. ,, 
' 
1; 
Before the end of the discussion, Lloyd George admitted that if Prinkipo failed 
to materialize then something else must be tried, leaving the secretary of war to 
~ 
324Ibid. In a later letter to Bonar Law, Lloyd George wrote, "Once the strike begins, it is 
imperative that.the state should win. Failure to do so would inevitably lead to a Soviet Republic." 
Lloyd George to Law, 19 March 1919. Morgan, Consensus, 49. 
325War Cabinet minutes, 12 February 1919. Churchill Papers, 522. 
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wonder whether the prime minister was giving in to his views.326 The next day 
Churchill continued to argue for some definite policy. Lloyd George, probably 
growing weary of his secretary of war's constant harrassment over the issue, 
suggested that Churchill go over to Paris to see for himself what could be 
accomplished. 327 
On February 14, Churchill crossed the channel to sit in "the seats of the 
I( 
Mighty."328 That night he spoke to the Supreme War Council as President 
Wilson was about to leave to catch a train on his way back to the United States. 
As Wilson impatiently leaned on the back of a chair, Churchill asked on behalf 
of Lloyd George "whether the Allied policy which had led to the suggestion of the 
meeting at Prinkipo was to be pursued or, if not, what policy was to be 
substituted for it. "329 Wilson replied that in his opinion all troops should be 
withdrawn from Russia and that he would be satisfied with informal meetings 
with the Bolsheviks. Seeing nothing definjte in Wilson's answer, Churchill 
optimistically wondered "whether the Council would approve of arming the 
Anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia should the Prinkipo Conference prove a 
failure. "330 Wilson hedged; he said he had only stated his own opinion, but he 
would follow the decision of the Council. The meeting was then adjourned. The 
next day Churchill sought to swing the Allies to his point of view. After hearing 
a report from General Alby that the Red Army could be easily defeated by 
inferior numbers of Allied troops, Churchill put forth an ultimatum on Prinkipo. 
326Henry Wilson diary, 12 February 1919. Ibid., 521. 
327Henry Wilson diary, 13 February 1919. Ibid., 525. Also see Chur~hill, 172-73. 
328Churchill, 173. 
329Supreme War Council, 14 February 1919. FR.US, PPC, 3: 1041-42. 
380Ibid., 1044. 
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Blaming the Bolsheviks for the current failure to hold a meeting (they had not 
explicitly accepted the condition of a cease fire), he presented a draft message 
demanding that the Bolsheviks must cease fire within ten days and withdraw 
five miles from the front or the Prinkipo proposal would be considered to have 
lapsed.331 Meanwhile an Allied council for Russian affairs would be set up to 
plan possible military action against the Bolsheviks if the plan did lapse. The 
Americans objected to Churchill's plans while the French and Italians were 
delighted. Balfour also demurred and helped to block the plan's acceptance for 
the moment. 
The next day the foreign secretary sent Churchill a letter. Having spent 
the past few weeks in Paris, he viewed the secretary of war as the prime 
minister's emissary and accepted that Churchill was to take the lead on the 
matter of Prinkipo. However, Balfour feared that Churchill was acting 
independently and sought to keep him in line with the government's wishes as 
well as his own. 
I see great merits in the Prinkipo scheme from the point of view of English 
and American Public Opinion .... He [Lloyd George] has sent you over here 
because, having been present at the Cabinet Meetings where the whole subject 
was discussed at length, you are not merely acq11ainted with the paper 
arguments on either side but are bathed in the atmosphere which prevails in 
Downing Street, and have received directions immediately from there.332 
Meanwhile Philip Kerr, also in Paris, was warning Lloyd George about the 
course of events. Kerr supported Churchill's new note on Prinkipo but feared 
that he was still bent on intervention. Lloyd George was warned "to watch the 
situation very carefully, if you do not wish to be rushed into the policy of a 
/. -, 
331Council of Ten, 15 February 1919. FRUS, PPC (Washington, DC 1944), 4: 13-14. Also see 
Chur.chill, 172. 
832Balfour to ChurchiU, 16 February 1919. Churchill Papers, 534. 
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volunteer war agf!inst the Bolsheviks in the near future."333 Lloyd George 
responded to Kerr th he also approved Churchill's cable to the Bolsheviks and 
was worried that ~ ........ urchill had gone beyond his instructions. The prime 
minister had only supported a plan to send small, "expert details who volunteer 
to go to Russia together with any equipment we can spare."334 In his message 
to Kerr, Lloyd George included a letter to Churchill. It was a strong rebuke, 
containing every relevant argument against intervention. He began by saying 
that Russia must save itself: "If Russia is really anti-Bolshevik, then a supply of 
equipment would enable it to redeem itself."335 Otherwise, it was none of 
Britain's business to be interfering with Russia's internal affairs. Such 
meddling moreover would create problems at home. 
An expensive war of aggression against Russia is a way to strengthen 
Bolshevism in Russia and create it at home. We cannot afford the burden. 
Chamberlain says we can hardly make both ends meet on a peace basis, even 
at the present crushing rate of taxation; and if we are committed to a war 
against a continent like Russia, it is the road to bankruptcy and Bolshevism in 
these islands.336 
Commenting then on the French support for Churchill's plans, Lloyd George 
said, "There is nothing they would like better than to see us pulling the 
chestnuts out of the fire for them. "337 Finally, the prime minister asked 
Churchill to keep in mind the industrial unrest at home. 
Were it known that you had gone over to Paris to propose a plan of war 
against the Bolsheviks, it would do more to incense organised labour than 
anything I can think of; and what is still worse, it would throw into the ranks 
of the extremists a very large l)umber of thinking people who now abhor their 
333Kerr to Lloyd George, 15 February 1919. Ibid., 532. 
334Lloyd George to Kerr, 16 Febrnary 1919. Churchill, 176. For Woodrow Wilson's reaction on 
hearing of Churchill's plans see Wilson to Lansing, 19 February 1919. FRUS, 1919, Russia, 71-72. 
335Lloyd George to Churchill, 16 February 1919. Lowe and Dockrill, 696. 
886Ibid. 
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Churchill immediately backed down from his previous position. 
At a meeting of the British Empire Delegation conducted by Balfour, 
Churchill's plans were reviewed. Balfour set the tone for the discussion by ii' 
stating, "All would agree that for military and political reasons it was 
impossible to contemplate any great military operation in Russia with a 
conscript army. "339 In response to questions, Churchill said he had never 
intended to put forward a specific policy; that was the business of the War 
Cabinet. He only sought to get a decision between large-scale intervention, the 
supply of money and materiel, or evacuation. It was for this reason that he had 
advocated' can Inter-Allied Military Commission. With this explanation, the 
delegation gave Churchill's proposal lukewarm support. That afternoon the 
Supreme War Council met. When Churchill's proposal was again raised, 
Colonel House, with the support of Balfour, strongly objected. Clemenceau 
exploded and said it was a pitiful thing to see the Allies afraid to deal with the 
problem. 340 The matter was put off for later discussion and eventually died of 
neglect. 
**** 
Returning to Paris on March 5, Lloyd George was aware that the Prinkipo 
proposal was a dead issue. This failure and the machinations of Churchill 
. ' 
showed him the full weight of the opposition to dealings with the Bolsheviks. 
888Ibid. 
/ 339BED meeting, 17 February 1919. DBFA, PPC, 3: 352. 
340Henry Wilson diary, 17 February 1919. Churchill Papers, 541. The minutes of the meeting 
were officially deleted by the Council but can be found in the Woodrow Wilson Papers (Princeton, 
NJ 1986), 55: 202-4. 
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Futhermore, Clemenceau had been shot in a failed assassination attempt on 
February 19, and the gunman was believed to be a Bolshevik. It was therefore 
impossible to try to renew Prinkipo as such a move would be considered an 
insult to the stricken hero: "Clemenceau would simply have to hold up a finger 
and the whole thing would drop to the ground. "341 Lloyd George had to find a 
new approach to the problem of Russia. In a letter to Kerr, he put forth his 
views on an alternative policy. 
No foreign intervention in Soviet Russia. No foreign troops to be sent to the 
aid of non-Bolshevik Russia unless votunteers choose to go of their own accord; but material assistance to be supplied to these Governments to enable them to hold their own territories which are not anxious to submit to Bolshevik rule. If 
these territories are sincerely opposed to Bolshevism then with Allied aid they 
can maintain their position .... Our principle ought to be 'Russia must save herself. '342 
This middle policy between intervention and evacuation was, in effect, a 
compromise with the Tories. Conservative opposition was just too strong to 
allow Lloyd George to abandon the Whites. As Frances Stevenson recorded in 
her diary, 
The Tories ... have got their tails up as the result of their success at the 
Election. 'George thinks he won the election,' said Walter Long to his 
neighbour at dinner the other night. 'Well he didn't. It was the Tories that 
won the election, and he will soon begin to find that out.'343 
What Lloyd George had to do was fmd the least expensive way to appease the 
Tory demand for continued support for the Whites. He recognized that his 
Chancellor of the Exchequer was already "experiencing the greatest difficulty in 
meeting essential demands for housing and land settlement for soldiers, and the 
burden of annual expenditure even on a peace footing will tax the resources of 
341The words of William Bullitt. Bullitt Mission, 34. 
842Lloyd Geo~ge to Kerr, 19 February 1919. Peace Conference, 1: 246. 
843Frances Stevenson diary, 5 March 1919. AJ.P. Taylor, ed. Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson (New York 1971), 169. Hereafter cited as Stevenson Diary. 
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this country to the utmost. "344 · By basing his decision on an economic 
argument, the prime minister could also neutralize to some extent the 
ideological charge the issue carried and appeal to the large number of 
businessmen among the Conservatives.345 In any event, such an approach 
could be used to dampen Churchill's fervor. Whenever the secretary of war 
renewed his call for a definite policy, Lloyd George would ask him for the War 
Office's report on the costs of the different alternatives: "It is no use clamouring 
for policy until the War Office ... can supply us with this information."346 
Churchill did eventually supply the information, including the costs of 
intervention to February 1919. The figures were frightening. It would cost 73 
million pounds (minus naval requirements) to conduct "very insignificant 
operations" for the next six months in the Archangel-Murn1ansk theater 
alone.~7 Not surprisingly, there was strong support for withdrawal. 
\,j \._~, \. 
Crossing the Channel, Lloyd George then sought t~~\convince the French to 
adopt his compromise policy. At a meeting with Clemenceau and House, Lloyd 
George related his experience in wringing cost figures from the War Office and 
the fmal report on costs. The French premier was staggered by the figures. He 
and House then supported Lloyd George's plan to supply the Whites only with 
surplus arms and materiel. The prime minister later recorded that "both were 
344Lloyd George to Churchill, 20 February 1919. Churchill Papers, 547. 
345J.M. McEwen, "The Coupon Election of 1918 and Unionist Members of Parliament," Journal, 
of Modem History, 34, 3 (September 1962): 302. Lloyd George referred to the government benches 
as the "Associated Chambers of Commerce." Chamberlain, 243 and Riddell Diary (16 February 
· 1919), 22. 
' . 
346Churchill Papers, 54 7. Also see War Cabinet Minutes, 26 February 1919. Ibid., 554-55. 
347War Cabinet minutes, 4 March 1919. Ibid., 568. 
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hostile to any plan for the invasion of Russia. "348 Having won over the Allie , 
Lloyd George was now sure enough of his position to make some definite policy 
decisions. The next day he met with Churchill and reached the following 
conclusions: Murmansk and Archangel were to be evacuated as soon as the ice 
melted, using volunteer reinforcements to cover the withdrawal; forces would be 
withdrawn from the Caucasus, leaving behind arms, munitions, and a military 
mission of instructors and technicians; and the two battalions at Omsk were to 
be sent home and replaced with a military mission. 349 
Settling the Russian problem was only part of winning the peace of 
Europe. The delay in concluding a final treaty was causing great dissatisfaction 
in Britain.350 Many believed that the lack of a fmal peace was the cause for the 
continuing labor unrest. As Lord Riddell ( owner of the News of the World) said, 
"It looks as if it is going to be a race between peace and anarchy. Until peace is 
signed the world will not settle down to work. "351 Already there had been 
rumors of a general strike by the Triple Alliance of miners, railwaymen, and 
transport workers. In mid-February the Consultative Committee of the Triple 
Alliance had begun a new round of informal meetings.352 One of Lloyd George's 
private secretaries even commented that the "conclusion of peace is really 
becoming very urgent from a trade and labour standpoint. "353 A month later a 
348
"Notes of an interview between M. Clemenceau, Colonel House and myself which was held at 
the Ministry of War, rue Dominicq, at 10:30 A.M., 7th. March, 1919." Peace Conference, 1: 191. 
349Churchill to Lloyd George, 8 March 1919. Churchill Papers, 581. 
350Stevenson Diary (18 March 1919), 174; The Times, 21 March 1919; and Riddell Diary (21 
March 1919), 36. 
351Riddell Diary (21 March 1919), 37. 
352The Times, 18 February 1919. 
353T. Jones to Hankey, 27 February 1919. Jones, Whitehall Diary, 79. 
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new threat arose. The National Union of Railwaymen called for a strike after 
negotiations with the Railway Executive broke down. 354 This incident fueled 
further rumors of a general strike.355 The growing impatience and unrest 
prompted Lloyd George to retire to Fontainebleau to formulate some plans for 
future negotiations. The resulting memorandum, while calling for a peace that 
would leave no causes for another war, accepted the connection between a 
European settlement and domestic peace. The reason for adopting a "long-
sighted peace" was the widespread, "deep sense not only of discontent, but of 
anger and revolt amongst the workmen against pre-war conditions. "356 The war 
in Russia only fueled domestic unrest. Therefore, if growing anarchy was to be 
avoided in the West, the Russian Civil War had to come to an end. 
Certainly, Lloyd George was trying to fmd a solution. He had already 
established a compromise policy to suit the Tories and the French, extending 
limited fmancial and material aid to the White counter-revolutionaries. This 
inconclusive, long-term policy however was not sufficient to avoid the continuing 
radicalization of labor. Lloyd George needed peace. The quickest and least 
expensive way to end the Russian Civil War was a negotiated settlement. Given 
Lloyd George's propensity for summit diplomacy, this was always an attractive 
alternative. The problem with this course of action was the lack of contact with 
the Soviet government, the pariah of the international community. A possible 
solution came with the Bullitt mission to Russia. Since February the United 
States had also been seeking a speedy solution to the Russian problem and had 
seen the need for information. A junior American diplomat, William Bullitt, 
354The Times, 17 March 1919. 
355Ibid., 19 March 1919; Stevenson Diary (18 March 1919), 173. 
356Fontainebleau Memorandum, 25 March 1919. Peace Conference, 1: 268. 
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was therefore directed by the Secretary of State to travel to Russia to gather 
intelligence. More specifically, Colonel House told him to find out exactly what 
terms the Soviet government would accept as the basis of a peace. 
The idea in the minds of the British and the American delegations were that 
if the Allies made another proposal it should be a proposal which we would 
know in advance would be accepted, so that there would be no chance of 
another Prinkipos proposal miscarrying.357 
,,,. 
Before leaving for Russia, Bullitt had discussions with Kerr and Hankey. Kerr, 
after discussions with Lloyd George and Balfour, sent Bullitt a letter containing 
\the terms for peace acceptable to the British government. It was made clear to 
,. Bullitt however that "these have no official significance and merely represent 
suggestions of my [Kerr's] own opinion. "358 Bullitt entered Russia on March 8 
and received conditions ·for peace from Chicherin with a deadline for their 
acceptance of April 10.359 Returning to Paris, Bullitt reported to Colonel House 
who was pleased with the results and was preparing to act upon them.360 
Bullitt also had a breakfast with Lloyd George that included the South African 
general Jan Christian Smuts, Hankey, and Kerr. At the meeting, Smuts told 
the prime minister that the Bolsheviks' offer should not be allowed to lapse .. 
Lloyd George agreed but said that British public opinion was a major problem. 
Bullitt related what followed: 
He had a copy of the Daily Mail in his hand, and he said, 'As long as the 
British press is doing this kind of thing how can you expect me to be sensible 
about Russia?' The Daily Mail was roaring and screaming about the whole 
Russian situation. 361 
857 Bullitt Mission, 38. 
358Ibid., 36. Also see unnumbered telegram, Kerr to R. Graham, 11 July 1919. DBFA PPC, 3: 
426. 
359See Bullitt's reports in FRUS, 1919, Russia, 75-80. 
36
°Colonel House diary, 25 March 1919. Woodrow Wilson Papers (Princeton, NJ 1987), 56: 279. 
861 Bullitt Mission, 66. 
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Lloyd George was .Probably referring to the March 27 edition of The Daily Mail 
which ran an editorial entitled "The Real Weakness Of Bolshevism." In this 
article the Bolsheviks were called "a mere gang of foreign adventurers" who only 
maintained power through "the feebleness and indecision of the Allies."362 The 
editorial concluded by calling for the peace conference to stop talking and to put 
Marshall Foch to work. Another factor working against Lloyd George's use of 
Bullitt's proposals was the recent victories by the Whites over the Red Army. In 
delayed reports from Russia in the British and French press, it was told that the 
Siberian army had made a 100 mile advance in late March. 363 The papers in 
/ 
Paris then immediately began to announce that Moscow would fall within two 
weeks. "[T]herefore everyone in Paris ... began to grow very lukewarm about 
peace in Russia."364 More unsettling to Lloyd George was the effect that rumors 
of Bullitt's proposals had on the House of Commons. 
**** 
There was already much concern among the Tory backbenchers over the 
Fontainebleau Memorandum. The prime minister had recognized after 
completing the paper that he would have "great difficulties in Parliament" if his 
conditions for peace were considered too moderate. 365 Bonar Law had also 
warned Lloyd George that calls for a moderate peace would cause a storm in the 
backbenches. He further added, "I have no doubt you realise all this, but 
perhaps you think opinion in the House has become more sane, and I fear that is 
362The Daily Mail, 27 March 1919. 
363The Times, 29 and 31 March 1919. 
864Bullitt Mission, 90. Also see Churchill, 179. 
365Council of Four minutes, 27 March 1919. P. Mantoux, The Paris Peace Conference, 1~1.9.: 
Proceedings of the Council of Four (Paris 1964), 27. 
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not the case."366 The Tories were being goaded by Lord Northcliffe's press. 
Since being denied a seat on the British peace delegation, the powerful press 
lord had launched a vendetta against the prime minister.367 To aid him in 
wreaking his revenge, Northcliffe had appointed Wickham Steed as editor of 
The Times, a man who had no love for Lloyd George. By the end of March 1919, 
both The Times and The Daily Mail had assumed a political position comparable 
to that held by the far Right press in Paris: Lloyd George was being soft on 
Germany and Bolshevism. In April an all out assault on the prime minister 
commenced. 
On April 3, The Times attacked the pro-German, pro-Bolshevik members 
of the Council of Four for proposing "a shameful 'deal' with the Bolsheviks" 
along the lines of the yet unreleased Bullitt proposals. 368 The editorial went on 
to say that Bolshevism was a German led movement which should be destroyed 
"~y a short, sharp Allied effort."369 The Daily Mail then attacked the ·' 
government for "indecision and ineptitude" as it reported that the British 
contingent at Archangel was "in peril. "370 These and other attacks took the rest 
of the British press by surprise. The New Statesman commented, "The Times, 
which appears suddenly to have changed its policy without explanation, has 
even gone so far as to declare that 'Allied politicians' ... have proved themselves 
unworthy to represent their countries and must be replaced by other spokesmen 
'who will do their duty,' and will not be subservient to 'men like Mr. Ramsay 
366Peace Conference, 1: 372. 
367 Ibid., 1 73-77. 
368The Times, 3 April 1919. 
S69[bid. 
370The Daily Mail, 4 April 1919. 
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MacDonald.'"371 Riddell described the week as one of "criticism and alarms" led 
by the Northcliffe press and the French papers.372 Lloyd George agreed, 
'll . 
complaining to Riddell, 
What do you think of the disgraceful attacks upon me in The Times and 
Daily Mail? They call me a pro-German. That is a libel. I have a good mind 
to bring an action. I shall certainly say in public what I think about 
N orthcliff e. 373 
Editorial attacks continued the next week, while, in the Commons, Northcliffe's 
old journalistic partner and Conservative member of Parliament, Kennedy 
Jones, whipped up backbench disaffection.374 
The result was a backbench revolt of some 370 members. On April 8 they 
sent a telegram to the prime minister, insisting that he present the "bill in full" 
to Germany.375 The next day another message was sent. Referring to the 
Bullitt proposals, it stated, 'We, the undersigned,_ learn with great concern that 
there is a proposal before the Peace Conference to recognize the Bolshevist 
" 
Government of Moscow ... and urge the British Plenipotentaries to decline to 
agree to any such recognition."376 That evening a debate was held on the issue 
of the government recognizing the Soviet government. As the Treasury bench 
was apparently empty, the debate was dominated by the backbenchers with 
Colonel Wedgwood fighting almost alone from the opposition benches. At the 
center of attention was a recently released government paper entitled "A 
Coiiection of Reports on Bolshevism In Russia," commonly know as "the atrocity 
.. 
371The New Statesman, 13, 313 (5 April 1919): 1. 
372Riddell Diary (5 April 1919), 45. 
373 lbid., 46. 
374Peace Conference, 1: 372. 
375The Times, 9 April 1919. 
3161bid., 10 April 1919. 
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bluebook. "377 It described in detail unsubstantiated reports of Bolsheviks 
atrocities against Russian civilians and soldiers, the mistreatment of British 
citizens, and the murder of the Tsar. Wedgwood called it "anonymous tittle 
tattle" and was shouted down with cries of "Shame!"378 Besides readings from 
the bluebook, the debate largely consisted of Tory backbenchers struggling to 
find adequate adjectives to express their loathing of the Bolshevik regime. 
Horatio Bottomley seemed the most successful, calling the Bolsheviks "inhuman 
scoundrels" who were "a blasphemy upon the name of God. "379 
The prime mjnjster responded to the revolt by deciding to return to 
London and, in effect, calling for a vote of confidence. He believed that, if there 
was an actual distrust of the peace delegation in Parliament, he would resign 
and call a general election. 380 After Lloyd George told the Council of Four his 
plans, Orlando asked him when he would return to Paris. Lloyd George replied, 
"I shall return on Friday, unless the House of Commons refuse a vote of 
confidence, in which case you will have to continue these conversations with 
, Lord Northcliffe or with Horatio Bottomley."381 On April 14 the prime minister 
left for London and Frances Stevenson recorded the event. 
D. left for London in excellent spirits. He has made up his mind to attack 
Northcliffe & declare war to the knife. He says that N. is intent on trying to 
oust him, so he (D.) is going to attack him now in order that people may know 
that N.'s motives are purely personal, & that he may be discredited from the 
outset.382 
377Cmd. 8 (April 1919), "A Collection of Reports on Bolshevism In Russia." 
378114 HC Deb, col. 2145, 9 April 1919. 
379Ibid., col. 2163, 9 April 1919. 
380Peace Conference, 1: 375; Riddell Diary (11 April 1919), 50. 
381Council of Four minutes, 11 April 1919. Mantoux, 175. 
882Steuenson Diary (14 April 1919), 179-80. 
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N orthcliffe and Steed continued to turn out belligerent editorials against the 
prime minister. The Times challenged Lloyd George to live up to his election 
promises and made it clear to the prime minister that he could no longer fool the 
British people with his1rhetoric.383 
These growing political problems were to have their effect on Russian 
policy. Obviously, peace with the Bolsheviks on the terms obtained by Bullitt 
would prove dangerously explosive and had to be abandoned. The proposals 
were certainly not important enough to Lloyd George to risk a vote of confidence 
over. What the Commons was really concerned about was the secrecy 
surrounding the discussions of the Council of Four. Clemenceau, Wilson, 
Orlando, and Lloyd George considered such silence necessary to facilitate 
negotiation. However, Northcliffe and Kennedy Jones played upon this secrecy 
by promoting fears that Lloyd George was giving the peace away. One way the 
prime minister could calm the anxieties of the Conservative members was by 
moving toward their position on Russia. He could fall back on his compromise 
solution of supplying the Whites with money and materiel which he had 
formulated in February.384 This plan of action was made easier because of the 
improved labor situation. The threat of a radicalized proletariat declined in late 
March as the government intervened to settle the railway dispute and the 
Sankey report was released, giving the miners hope that their demands would 
be met.385 Furthermore, April marked the beginning of the post-war economic 
,. 
383The Times, 11, 14 and 16 April 1919. 
384Bullitt said that Lloyd George took this action ·because he found that the Commons had been 
rigged against him by N othcliffe and Churchill. The Tory backbenchers "were ready to slay him 
then and there" if Lloyd George came out in favor of Bullitt's proposals. (Bullitt Mission, 95.) According to the sparse and somewhat cryptic evidence available, this belief appears to have been 
a widespread rumor. (See Henry Wilson diary, 3 and 8 April 1919, Churchill Papers, 605, 609; Stevenson Diary (13 April 1919), 179.) " 
385The Times, 21, 22, and 28 March 1919. 
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boom. 386 The increasing optimism and employment served to damped 
industrial discontent, bringing a decline in labor unrest. 
On April 16 Lloyd George made his statement to the Commons upon the 
motion to adjourn for the Easter recess. After describing the difficulties of 
working at the peace conference ("stones clattering on the roof, and crashing 
through the windows, and sometimes wild men screaming through the key 
holes"), the prime minister asked that the British delegation be left in peace to 
work or that other men be sent to Paris. 387 Lloyd George then turned to the 
matter of Russia. He first addressed the concern that he intended to recognize 
.,. 
the Soviet government. There was no question of recognition, the prime 
minister declared. In fact, the matter had never been discussed or put forward. 
The issue of intervention was then taken up. In no way could he justify the use 
of a gigantic military enterprise to crush Bolshevism. Such action would be 
against the furidamental British principle of non-interf~fence in the internal 
affairs of another country. Furthermore, he stated, "I share the horror of all 
Bolshevik teachings, but I would rather leave Russia Bolshevik until she sees 
her way out of it than see Britain bankrupt. And that is the surest road to 
Bolshevism in Britain."388 However, non-intervention did not mean 
abandonment. 
If we, as soon as they had served our purpose, and as soon they had taken all 
the risks, had said, 'Thank you; we are exceedingly obliged to you. You have 
served our purpose. We need you no longer. Now let the Bolshevists cut your 
throats,' we should have been mean -- we should have been thoroughly 
unworthy indeed of any great land .... lt is our business ... to stand by our 
386E.V. Morgan, Studies In British Financial Policy, 1914-1925 (London 1952), 86; S. Howson, 
Domestic Monetary Management in Britain, 1919-38 (London 1975), 9, 23. 
387114 HC Deb, col.2938. 
388Jbid., col. 2942. 
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friends. Therefore, we are not sending troops, but we are supplying goods. 389 
Here was the government's new policy. Accepting the Die-Hard position that 
Britain had a moral obligation to the White Russians, Lloyd George set forth the 
compromise he had formulated in February. He however said that this was not 
enough because "we want peace in Russia."390 The world would only find peace, 
he continued, when the Russian Civil War came to an end. Ref erring to the 
Prinkipo proposal, Lloyd George commented that he had made an effort to 
secure peace "among the warring sections ... by inducing them to come together" 
and made no apologies for it.391 J.R. Clynes then asked the prime minister 
about the latest attempt to reach a settlement with the Soviet government. 
Lloyd George responded that there were no new approaches at all. However, he 
continued, 
I think I know to what the right honorable Gentleman refers. There was a 
suggestion that there was some young American who had come back. All I can 
say about that is that it is not for me to judge the value of these 
communications. But if the President of the United States had attached any 
value to them, he would have brought them before the Conference, and he 
certainly did not do so. 392 
Lloyd George then concluded his talk on Russia saying that the Commons and 
the country should not consider the possibility of another great war. Britain 
had had quite enough bloodshed. 
The prime minister spent the rest of his speech attacking Northcliffe. 
Lloyd George said he could not conceive of a worse crime than sowing strife and 
distrust among the Allies while they were trying to settle the peace of the world. 
38ilbid., cols. 2942-43. 
390Ibid., col. 2944. 
391/bid., col. 2944. 
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Referring indirectly to an earlier editorial in The Times, he declared that he had 
every intention of living up to his campaign pledges: "I do not wish to get out of 
them in the least. "393 Lloyd George then turned to the matter of the telegrams. 
Saying that one "cannot always be leaving the Conference to come home to clear 
up this or that," the prime minister directly attacked Kennedy Jones and ~s 
"reliable source" of information on the events in Paris, Northcliffe.394 Under the 
thinnest disguise, Lloyd George attacked Northcliffe as having a "diseased 
vanity."395 He then called The Times a mere threepenny edition of The Daily 
Mail which for some unknown reason was considered a serious newspaper. 
Lloyd George concluded by apologizing to the Commons for talring notice of the 
"kind of trash" these papers had published in the last few weeks. 396 
**** 
The prime minister considered the speech a complete success. By focusing 
on Russia and Northcliffe, Lloyd George had avoided any discussion of the real 
issues before the peace conference, thus allowing himself freedom of manoeuver 
during the negotiations. 397 The speech also quieted the N orthcliffe press and 
proved very popular with the many members of Parliament who hated the press 
lord. 398 His statement on Russia revealed that Lloyd George could not 
overcome Conservative opposition to his own plan to get out of Russia. Faced 
393114 HC Deb, col. 2948. The editorial referred to is in The Times, 11 April 1919. 
394114 HC Deb, col. 2952. 
395Ibid., col. 2953. 
396Ibid., col. 2953. 
397 Stevenson Diary (17 April 1919), 180; Riddell Diary (17 April 1919), 52; and Peace Conference, 1: 383-84. 
398Riddell Diary (4 May 1919), 66. 
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with a head-on conflict with the backbenchers, the prime minister chose 
compromise over a fight on whether to deal with the Bolsheviks. The Bullitt 
proposals went the way of the Prinkipo plan. The abandonment of the path to a 
negotiated settlement was facilitated by the decline in labor unrest and the 
improvement in the economy. Higher employment would hopefully dissipate 
radicalism, though it also reduced the urgency of reconstruction. Thus the costs 
of aid to the Whites would be off set. -
,_ 
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Conclusion: A Last Look 
at Lloyd George's Russian Policy 
The evidence presented here confirms the view of most recent historians 
that Lloyd George held consistent goals in Russian policy. He sought to 
withdraw Britain from Russian affairs and to make peace with the Soviet 
government which he considered Russia's de facto government. According to the 
prime minister's philosophy, which followed Liberal tradition, Russia should be 
allowed to detern1ine its own fate and an end to the Civil War was necessary for 
Europe's peace and economic recovery. Lloyd George, therefore, did not fit 
Keynes' description of a prime minister "rooted in nothing" and "void and 
without content." His policy appeared erratic because of his roundabout ways of 
pursuing his policy goals. 
Beyond Lloyd George's personal views (and Thompson's outline of events), 
what domestic influences encouraged the prime minister to seek an end to 
intervention? N orthedge in his brief overview seems to have covered most of 
them: social unrest, public opinion, and fmancial problems. However, he and 
other historians fail to show how these factors were linked. The social and 
money troubles found their focus in the prime minister's plans for 
reconstruction. Social reforms were demanded by the public and were widely 
viewed in government circles as a cure for the growing radicalism in Britain. 
Reconstruction, however, was a costly endeavour which was endangered by 
financial difficulties caused by the war. The demands of economic orthodoxy for 
a balanced budget, combined with growing military commitments, threatened to 
squeeze social spending out of the budget. Only by reducing military 
expenditures -- most notably operations in Russia -- could Lloyd George find the It 
money needed for the popularly supported reforms. Past failures by historians 
106 
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to see these interconnections probably originated in their view of the role of 
Lloyd George in foreign policy. They saw him as a diplomat concentrating on 
foreign affairs rather than a politician seeking to win the next election at home. 
Another reason for the lack of attention paid to the roles of economic and 
reconstruction factors in Russian policy was the focusing on political 
developments, especially when viewed as battles between the radicals and 
conservatives. As Mayer and Schmidt demonstrate, the ideological approach is 
certainly a valid one. However, they fail to present the entire picture. This has 
been a persistent flaw in most studies of Lloyd George's Russian policy. 
Political factors received so much attention because they were viewed as 
the determinants of Lloyd George's actions. As he was very much the politician 
and leader of a coalition government, political factors did play the dominant 
part in changing the course of Russian policy. However, this was largely a 
negative role. While Lloyd George certainly adapted his policy throughout early 
1919 to Tory opposition, he did not change his long-term goals as was evidenced 
in the great interest he had in the Bullitt proposals for a negotiated settlement 
with the Bolsheviks. The policy announced by the prime minister in his April 
16 speech before the House of Commons did not mark the abandonment of his 
goals but rather a change in strategy. It must therefore be admitted that Lloyd 
George failed to reach his goals in the short-term because of political opposition. 
However, the financial and social pressures pushing for a total end to 
intervention were to persist and move the Tories towards the prime minister's 
position on Russia. In the end, with the signing of the Anglo-Soviet trade 
agreement in 1921, Lloyd George was able to achieve his goals . 
• 
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